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INTRODUCTION 
The institution of acquisitive prescription has startling transformative 
power.1 A person who commences possession of immovable property in 
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 1. As French commentators G. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Albert Tissier once 
remarked, “Prescription is the transformation of a state of fact in a state of law.” G. 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & ALBERT TISSIER, PRESCRIPTION: TRAITE THEORIQUE ET 
PRACTIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS  ¶ 275, at 145 (La. St. L. 
Inst. trans. 1972) (4th ed. 1924).  




good faith and with a just title can acquire ownership that is good against 
the world after just ten years of uninterrupted possession.2 Even more 
remarkable is that a possessor who does not commence possession in good 
faith or who lacks a just title can still acquire ownership of an immovable 
after 30 years of uninterrupted possession.3 Finally, a person who merely 
uses another person’s land in a limited manner can acquire a real right in the 
form of an apparent servitude through either ten or 30 years of quasi-
possession.4 
According to several Louisiana jurists and commentators, the venerable 
institution of acquisitive prescription in Louisiana is now under threat.5 The 
source of that threat is a recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. In 
Boudreaux v. Cummings,6 the plaintiff, John Boudreaux, and his 
ancestors-in-title had used a pathway across his neighbor’s property since 
1948 to gain access to a public road and to transport farm equipment to 
and from the property.7 In 2012, Paul Cummings, the new owner of the 
adjacent land, prevented Boudreaux from using the pathway.8 Boudreaux 
sued, claiming that he and his ancestors-in-title had acquired a predial 
servitude across Cummings’s land by virtue of 30 years of uninterrupted 
quasi-possession.9 Cummings defended the lawsuit by arguing that 
Boudreaux’s possession did not count for purposes of acquisitive 
prescription because it had always been “precarious,” that is, it had been 
exercised “with the permission of or on behalf of the owner.”10 Although 
                                                                                                             
 2. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3473–3476 (2016) (providing for ten-year acquisitive 
prescription of immovables for a possessor with just title and good faith; providing 
that possessor need only have good faith at commencement of possession).  
 3. Id. arts. 3486–3488.  
 4. Id. arts. 740, 742. 
 5. See Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 568 (La. 2015) (Knoll, J., 
dissenting) (warning that the majority decision in Boudreaux “severely jeopardizes 
the law on acquisitive prescription in this state”); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL 
SERVITUDES § 6.36, in LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2013 & Supp. 
2016) (reiterating Justice Knoll’s warning and advising that the majority holding in 
Boudreaux “should not be read broadly and should not be read to equate permission 
with a landowner’s awareness and failure to object to a disturbance or eviction”); 
Andrew M. Cox, Boudreaux v. Cummings: The Louisiana Supreme Court 
Presumes Away the Right to Acquire a Servitude of Passage, 90 TUL. L. REV. 973, 
984 (2016) (suggesting that faulty reasoning in Boudreaux “looms dangerously over 
the right to prescribe a servitude of passage”). 
 6. 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015). 
 7. Id. at 560.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 561 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2011)). 




the trial court and a majority of the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of 
Appeal ruled in favor of Boudreaux, a narrow four-justice majority of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and held that Boudreaux’s quasi-
possession of the right of way was, in fact, precarious, and thus could not 
lead to acquisitive prescription.11 
More particularly, the majority opinion in Boudreaux appears to 
undermine the strong presumption in favor of possessors found in article 
3427 of the Civil Code.12 Relying on commentary interpreting an article 
from the 1870 Civil Code and its source article in the French Civil Code 
of 1804,13 the majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court found that 
Boudreaux’s use of the pathway across his neighbor’s property occurred 
with the “implied or tacit permission” of his original neighbors as a 
“gesture of neighborly accommodation.”14 Despite the strong presumption 
in favor of a possessor expressed in article 3427, the majority held that 
“under the limited circumstances where ‘indulgence’ and acts of ‘good 
neighborhood’ are present,” the possessor’s acts of possession are 
presumed to have occurred with the owner’s “tacit permission.”15 Thus, as 
the Court put it, “Cummings’[s] awareness of Boudreaux’s use and his 
allowance thereof marks Boudreaux’s use as an authorized use that cannot 
be characterized as adverse under the circumstances.”16 In apparent 
recognition of the difficult legal and factual issues the case raised, the 
majority took the unusual step of stating that its holding in Boudreaux was 
“strictly limited to the facts before us.”17  
Justice Jeannette Knoll authored a blistering dissent in Boudreaux. 
She contends that the majority decision “eviscerates the well-established 
burden-shifting structure laid out in our Civil Code” by allowing an owner 
to prevail in an acquisitive prescription case based simply on an assertion 
of “neighborliness” without having to introduce any evidence that a 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. at 562–64. 
 12. See id at 566. (“One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he 
began to possess in the name of and for another.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 (2016)). 
 13. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 139, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 1997). 
 14. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562. 
 15. Id. at 563. 
 16. Id. at 564. The majority’s reference to the awareness of Cummings is 
itself confusing because the period of tacit permission would have begun during 
the ownership of Cummings’ predecessor-in-title. As discussed in Part III, Justice 
Weimer’s concurring opinion focuses more extensively—and properly—on the 
relationship between Boudreaux and Cumming’s predecessor-in-title—the 
Weills. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 568–72 (Weimer, J., concurring). 
 17. Id. 




claimant’s possession is actually precarious.18 Two other justices joined 
Justice Knoll in dissent.19 Penning a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice 
John Weimer agreed with the majority’s disposition of the case but justified 
his conclusion based on additional facts in the record while also reflecting on 
the utilitarian and moral values that both support and complicate 30-year “bad 
faith” acquisitive prescription in Louisiana.20 
This Article seeks to place the controversy spawned by the majority opinion 
in Boudreaux—and in particular the controversy over precarious possession—
in a broader doctrinal framework. At the outset, however, this framework 
acknowledges that precarious possession has rarely been a problem in cases 
involving claims of ten-year, good-faith acquisitive prescription. In those cases, 
although precarious possession could theoretically be asserted as a defense 
by a landowner, courts primarily focus on whether the claimant actually 
possessed the land at issue by virtue of a “just title,”21 or whether the 
claimant’s profession of “good faith” was reasonable in light of objective 
circumstances.22 With that caveat in place, this Article takes aim at the 
problem of precarious possession in the context of bad-faith acquisitive 
prescription or when bad-faith acquisitive prescription is likely to be 
asserted after the completion of a possessory action. 
To address whether precarious possession is actually undermining the 
institution of acquisitive prescription, this Article takes a step back and 
looks at a broad range of precarious possession cases decided in the last 
50 years in Louisiana. This broader review reveals that almost all 
precarious possession disputes fall into one of three different relational 
contexts. The first involves parties who are more or less strangers to one 
another. In the second, parties find themselves connected to one another 
through a contractual relationship or by virtue of some special legal status, 
typically a co-ownership or family relationship, or some other sui generis 
special relationship. The third context involves parties who are neighbors 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
 19. Justice Crichton also authored his own short dissenting opinion in which 
he contended that the legal presumption to which Boudreaux was entitled as a 
possessor combined with Cummings’s failure to present any evidence to rebut that 
presumption should have mandated affirming the lower court rulings. Id. at 572–
73 (Crichton, J., dissenting). Justice Hughes dissented for the reasons given by 
both Justice Knoll and Justice Crichton. Id. at 572. 
 20. Id. at 568–72 (Knoll, J. dissenting). 
 21. Compare Cantrelle v. Gaude, 700 So. 2d 523 (La. Ct. App. 1997), with 
Barrios v. Panepinto, 133 So. 3d 36, 38 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 22. See, e.g., Philips v. Parker, 483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986); Mai v. Floyd, 951 
So. 2d 244 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 




and know one another relatively well or who are at least members of the 
same relatively small or tight-knit community. 
In the first two classes of cases, the rules and presumptions located in 
the Louisiana Civil Code and developed by Louisiana courts tend to 
operate effectively. With some notable exceptions, these first two kinds of 
precarious possession cases—stranger cases and contractual or legal status 
cases—yield relatively predicable results that are consistent with many of 
the utilitarian and natural rights justifications traditionally offered both to 
support and limit acquisitive prescription. 
Cases involving neighbors and members of close-knit communities, 
however, tend to create more challenges. In this third category of 
acquisitive prescription cases, the results appear, just as in Boudreaux, 
more unstable and unpredictable. In these cases, the powerful normative 
arguments justifying acquisitive prescription conflict sharply with the 
normative justifications for the limiting effect of precarious possession. To 
help parties and courts resolve these difficult neighbor and close-knit 
community cases, Louisiana law needs a more refined approach. First, 
Louisiana courts must forthrightly acknowledge the long-term, mutually 
beneficial relationships that are at the heart of these especially difficult 
cases. Second, Louisiana courts should consider applying a presumption of 
sharing in these cases. 
With this new presumption of sharing, this Article introduces a principle 
that will honor an important normative value that already underlies much of 
Louisiana property law and that courts often expressly recognize. The 
principle is that neighbors should be encouraged, as Judge Weimer himself 
recognized in Boudreaux, to act “as a good neighbor in allowing use of 
[their] property.”23 Louisiana law should create incentives for neighbors 
to form relationships of mutual support and accommodation. It should 
reward, not punish, neighbors who share their resources with one another. 
It should respect neighbors who engage in cooperative practices that 
enable all members of a close-knit community to gain access to the 
resources they need to flourish as human beings. The presumption of 
sharing this Article calls for will validate the moral impulse that Louisiana 
judges often recognize in these kinds of cases. Accordingly, owners who 
appear to have granted their neighbors consent to possess or access their 
property would, at the outset of that relationship at least, benefit from a 
presumption that they are sharing their property with a neighbor who needs 
it for some limited purpose. 
At some point in time, however, typically after a long pattern of 
continuous activity, possession that began with an implied permission of the 
                                                                                                             
 23. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 572. 




owner and that was motivated by a normatively attractive desire to share 
resources can lead non-owners to believe that they have acquired real rights 
in the property to which they have gained access. The non-owners may 
begin to organize their affairs in a manner that depends on the continuing 
access to the neighbor’s property. They may make investments in their own 
property or make improvements in the neighbor’s property that are 
grounded in a reasonable expectation that access will continue. Further, as 
time passes, the original parties, as well as their heirs, descendants, and 
successors, may forget the circumstances surrounding the original implied 
permission that led to the original access or possession. Indeed, possessors 
might quite reasonably come to believe that they are possessing just as an 
owner would possess or that they are enjoying another’s property in the 
same manner a servitude holder would enjoy it. 
In these situations, possessors should have the ability to rebut the 
presumption of sharing by introducing evidence to show that the originally 
permissive nature of the possession has been transformed into possession as 
owner. Article 3439 of the Civil Code recognizes this necessity in part by 
providing that “co-owner[s]” can begin to possess adversely by demonstrating 
“overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice” to their co-owners and 
by recognizing that “[a]ny other precarious possessor[s]” can begin to 
possess adversely by giving “actual notice” of their intentions to the 
owner.24 In cases involving neighbors and members of close-knit 
communities, however, in which possession may have occurred for 
especially long periods of time and memories are likely to have faded, the 
“actual notice” standard of article 3439 often fails. It fails because it is too 
rigid and formalistic a tool for courts to use in these complex relational 
contexts. In response to this inflexibility, this Article proposes to allow a 
neighbor or close-knit community member to rebut the presumption of 
sharing in the specific relational context of a neighbor dispute by 
demonstrating the termination of precarious possession by resorting to a 
set of indicia of giving or renunciation. Collectively, these indicia provide 
an outer limit on the presumption of sharing and give courts a set of specific 
criteria to use in determining when the presumption of sharing has reached its 
breaking point.25 
This Article’s observation that precarious possession serves as a doctrinal 
safety valve to reign in or limit bad-faith acquisitive prescription’s startling 
transformative power has a curious common law analogue. In 1983, Professor 
                                                                                                             
 24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439 (2016). 
 25. This Article recognizes that courts should always be cognizant that an 
“acknowledgment” of another person’s property or contractual rights, whether 
“formal or informal, express or tacit,” can interrupt prescription. See LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 3464 cmt. c. 




Richard Helmholz published a seminal article regarding the role of subjective 
intent in American adverse possession law.26 Helmholz argued that common 
law courts were consistently rejecting assertions of adverse possession when 
it appeared that the claimant did not possess the disputed land in good faith.27 
According to Helmholz, this practice of favoring good-faith claimants 
contradicted hornbook law, which consistently took the position that an 
adverse possessor’s subjective intent was irrelevant as long as the claimants 
could show that their possession was “hostile,” that is, not permissive.28 
Although Helmholz’s claim about the powerful sub-rosa importance of good 
faith in adverse possession was challenged by another eminent scholar at the 
time,29 the important point for Louisiana is that there is evidence that other 
U.S. courts are often uncomfortable with the end result of adverse 
possession or acquisitive prescription, especially when an adverse 
possessor in bad faith is poised to acquire ownership or a prescriptive 
servitude. 
Part I of this Article briefly traces the historical evolution of acquisitive 
prescription in civil law with a particular emphasis on the debate over 
whether bad-faith acquisitive prescription should be permitted to overcome 
the rights of formal titleholders. This Part also evaluates how French and 
Louisiana commentators have understood the role of precarious possession 
as a doctrine limiting acquisitive prescription. Finally, it reviews the solid 
policy justifications for Louisiana’s two-tier good- and bad-faith acquisitive 
prescription regime. 
Part II sets forth a taxonomy of precarious possession cases in Louisiana 
and shows how Louisiana courts have resolved stranger cases and 
contractual relationship and legal status cases with relative consistency. This 
Part concludes by showing that neighbor and close-knit community cases, 
                                                                                                             
 26. R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 331 (1983).  
 27. Id. at 339–40. 
 28. Id. at 331–33. 
 29. Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A 
Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1986). Cunningham contended 
that most U.S. courts—those not bound by a statute or state supreme court 
precedent requiring the adverse possessor to have a good-faith belief he was 
possessing as owner—still adhered to the objective interpretation of the “hostile 
by claim of right” element and, moreover, that most of the decisions adverse to 
bad-faith possessors upon which Helmholz relied could be explained on other 
grounds. Id. Although Helmholz and Cunningham continued their debate, the 
controversy has never been definitively resolved. See R.H. Helmholz, More on 
Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 65 
(1986); Roger A. Cunningham, More on Adverse Possession: A Rejoinder to 
Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1167 (1986). 




however, are especially difficult for Louisiana courts to resolve and tend to 
produce the most inconsistent results. 
Finally, Part III explains why, in the most difficult category of 
precarious possession cases—those involving neighbors or members of the 
same close-knit community—Louisiana law would be well served by the 
introduction of a presumption of sharing and an indicia of renunciation or 
giving. After explaining this new framework for category three cases and 
addressing some likely objections, the conclusion of Part III returns to 
Boudreaux v. Cummings and shows how that case might have been 
resolved in light of this new framework. 
I. UP FROM ROME 
A. Acquisitive Prescription in the Civil Law Tradition 
Although most of this Article addresses developments in Louisiana 
precarious possession jurisprudence that have occurred over the last 50 
years, it is impossible to assess those developments without some 
understanding of the Roman, Spanish, and French sources of Louisiana 
law on acquisitive prescription and precarious possession in particular. 
This Section emphasizes three crucial points about pre-codification civil 
law: first, the variability of Roman law over time with respect to the 
requirements of good faith and just title for acquisitive prescription; 
second, the dispute in pre-codification French law over the propriety of 
recognizing bad-faith acquisitive prescription; and third, the acceptance of 
a Romanist, as opposed to a Canonist, conception of acquisitive 
prescription when France finally codified its civil law in the Code 
Napoleon.  
1. Roman Law and Pre-Codification French Law 
Louisiana’s double-barreled institution of good- and bad-faith acquisitive 
prescription is derived from French and Spanish law and thus ultimately from 
Roman law. Roman law on acquisitive prescription was neither static nor 
simple. From the time of the Twelve Tables to Justinian’s compilation, 
Roman law recognized that possession could lead to acquisition of ownership 
through either usucapio or prescriptio. At various time periods during the 
Roman Empire, Roman law required that the possessor have a title and 
possess in good faith. At other historical moments, it recognized the 
possibility that individuals whom Louisiana law might classify as bad-faith 




possessors could also acquire ownership.30 For instance, in the later imperial 
period, Roman law recognized both the institutions of longi temporis 
praescriptio, that is, long-term prescription, which required just title and good 
faith,31 and longissimi temporis praescriptio, that is, very long-term 
prescription, which allowed a possessor who lacked title or good faith to plead 
30-year prescription as a defense to an action in revendication.32 Eventually 
Justinian’s compilation codified a form of long-term prescription that required 
good faith and 10 to 20 years of possession and made very long-term 
prescription an affirmative mode of acquisition that required good faith at the 
commencement of the possession.33 
The nature of acquisition prescription with respect to immovables in pre-
codification French law was no less contested. During the early post-Roman 
period, some regions of France followed written law, that is, Roman law, on 
acquisitive prescription, but in other regions customary law resisted the 
influence of Roman law and preserved idiosyncratic prescription rules.34 Yet 
even in areas where Roman law was followed, the difficulty of meeting the 
requirements of good faith, just title, and 10 to 20 years of possession meant 
that in practice 30-year prescription, which did not require title, was often the 
primary means of prescription.35 In regions where local custom was followed, 
both the 10-to-20-year and 30-year prescriptions were used.36  
The regional conflicts over the actual law in practice also mirrored a 
deeper philosophical debate in France. Advocates of canon law, as Baudry-
Lacantinerie and Tissier explain, “generally tried to inject morality and equity 
into the institution of prescription,”37 ignored the utilitarian goals of 
prescription, and tried to limit the institution to one providing merely a 
                                                                                                             
 30. See generally Ernst J. Marais, Acquisitive Prescription in View of the 
Property Clause 18–27 (Aug. 5, 2011) (L.L.D. Dissertation, University of 
Stellenbosch) (discussing Tabula 6.3 of the Twelve Tables); DAVID JOHNSTON, 
ROMAN LAW IN CONTEXT 57 (1999); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ROMAN LAW 122–24 (1st ed. 1975); BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 
1, ¶¶ 3–8, at 4–6. 
 31. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 8–10, at 6–7; 
NICHOLAS, supra note 30, at 128. 
 32. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 11, at 7.  
 33. Id.; NICHOLAS, supra note 30, at 127.  
 34. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 9. Domat also 
noted the regional diversity of approaches to acquisitive prescription in the pre-
codification era. 1 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 869, ¶ 
2189 (William Strahan trans., Little, Brown & Co. 1853) (1694). 
 35. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 10.  




“presumption of ownership or the discharge of a debt.”38 In contrast, civil law 
proponents sought to leave good faith out of 30-year prescription entirely and 
require it only at the commencement of 10-to-20-year prescription.39 The state 
of Spanish law regarding acquisitive prescription was similar to pre-
codification French Law in that multiple modes of prescription were 
recognized,40 leading in turn to scholastic debates over the ultimate purpose 
of acquisitive prescription.41 
The most important point for this Article’s purposes is that the choice 
between a unitary system, in which only good-faith acquisitive prescription is 
allowed, and a two-tier system, in which both good- and bad-faith acquisitive 
prescription are permitted, was clearly apparent to the French jurists on the 
eve of French codification and thereafter.42 Moreover, commentators like 
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier clearly sympathized with the Romanist 
approach and rejected the canon law view. They regarded a good-faith 
requirement as an anachronistic relic of a more violent feudal era,43 one that 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. By contrast, canon law insisted that there be good faith throughout the 
entire period of possession. Id. 
 40. For example, Las Siete Partidas acknowledged the existence of both 
good- and bad-faith acquisitive prescription with respect to immovables. 1 THE 
LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 382 (L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carlton trans. 
1978) (1820) (providing for 10- and 20-year prescription of “things immoveable 
and incorporeal” for possessors “in good faith, either by purchase, or exchange or 
as a donation or legacy, or by any other just title”); id. at 384–85 (providing “[i]f 
a man have continued possession of a thing during thirty years or more, no matter 
how he obtained it; and no suit be brought against him for it, during the whole of 
that time, he will acquire it by prescription”). 
 41. See also JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 142–44 
(2006) (discussing work of 17th-century Dutch and Spanish scholars known as 
the “late scholastics” who, following Aquinas, attempted to rationalize the 
existence of bad-faith acquisitive prescription). 
 42. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 17, at 7 (noting 
that within Roman law one could find “the two institutions which we shall again 
find in the Civil code in the form of acquisitive prescription of immovables: the 
prescription of ten-to-twenty years with just title and good faith; and the 
prescription by thirty years”).  
 43. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 19, at 11. 
Although it conforms better with morality, a doctrine requiring good 
faith in an absolute manner, is a source of difficulty in practice. There 
was possibly a reason for it during the feudal era when plunder must have 
been frequent. But under normal conditions it does not seem to be the 
rule of law which should prevail. 




introduced too many “artificial pretexts” and special interest protections into 
a socially beneficial institution.44 
2. French Codification and Subsequent French Commentary 
Justifying Acquisitive Prescription 
The promulgation of the Code Civil in 1804 resolved the debate in 
France over the extent and purposes of acquisitive prescription. Rather 
than limit acquisitive prescription to good-faith possessors,45 the Code 
Civil provided a general 30-year acquisitive prescription available to any 
possessor, regardless of his bona fides or mala fides.46 Planiol emphasized 
that this 30-year acquisitive prescription represented “the general rule in 
matters of acquisitive prescription,” while the “abridged prescription” of 10 
to 20 years was “an exception.”47 For Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, this 
broad understanding of acquisitive prescription was an article of faith.48 
The classic French commentators still revered in Louisiana today 
generally justified acquisitive prescription in similar terms. To start, all 
observed that acquisitive prescription is necessary to promote certainty and 
stability in ownership, particularly when it comes to long-term possessors 
                                                                                                             
 44. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 19, at 10–11. 
 45. The Code Civil did provide a 10-to-20-year prescriptive period for good-
faith possessors with just title in article 2265. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] 
art. 2265 (Fr.) (Barrister of the Inner Temple trans. 1824) (1804).  
 46. Id. art. 2262. “All actions, as well real as personal, are prescribed by thirty 
years, without compelling the party who alleges it to produce a document thereon, 
or without permitting an objection to be opposed to him derived from bad faith.” 
Id. According to Aubry and Rau, the reference to “bad faith” in the last clause of 
article 2262, combined with article 690, which provided for acquisitive 
prescription of apparent and continuous servitudes without just title or good faith, 
meant that 30-year acquisitive prescription provided not just a defense to a claim 
for restitution by the “legitimate owner,” but also “a means to acquire ownership.” 
AUBRY & RAU, 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS: DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 216 (Paul 
Esmein ed., 7th ed. 1966). See also C. CIV. art. 690 (Fr.). 
 47. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 574 (La. St. L. Inst. 
trans., 12th ed. 1959) (1939). 
 48. As they put it:  
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership as a result of 
a lawful possession over a certain period of time. Thus if I enter into 
possession of land belonging to my neighbor and hold it thirty years as 
if it were mine, the fact of my possession will become a legal title at the 
end of this period. If the former owner then claims his property, I can 
plead prescription and he will lose. 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 25, at 15. 




who possess by virtue of some title or conveyance. Such possessors, they 
noted, would otherwise have to prove a perfect chain of title back to some 
original grant from the sovereign, a burden that can often be difficult, if 
not impossible, to meet, whenever they were challenged by a purported 
record owner relying on a more ancient title or conveyance.49 From this 
perspective, acquisitive prescription provides an efficient and fair method 
for this presumably innocent or good faith, long-term possessor to 
establish ownership and beat back an apparently predatory claim based on 
an ancient instrument. It is efficient because the evidence of possession 
would presumably be more readily accessible than incomplete or old title 
records. It is also fair, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier suggested, because 
community acquiescence to the long-term possession must mean that the 
possessor has some legitimate foundation for the possession.50 In general, 
then, acquisitive prescription serves the valuable social purpose of 
aligning title with long-term possession.  
Second, focusing on 30-year acquisitive prescription in particular, 
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier justified “[the] spoliation of the owner” 
on the owner’s own “gross negligence” in failing to protect the right and 
on the likelihood that the owner’s “long silence” will lead the possessor to 
conclude, with justification, that the owner has “renounced his right.”51 
Planiol similarly justified bad-faith acquisitive prescription by citing the 
record owner’s “negligence” in failing to perform acts of possession or 
otherwise protect the title.52 Further emphasizing the adverse possessor’s 
perspective and anticipating modern reliance interest theories,53 Baudry-
Lacantinerie and Tissier also justified the transfer of title based on the 
natural rights of the bad-faith possessor “who through thirty uninterrupted 
years of work, activity, and, perhaps, worry, has sufficiently expiated the 
violation of an unclaimed right” and thus deserves some form of 
“amnesty.”54 
Finally, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier also justified acquisitive 
prescription from an even broader, societal perspective by suggesting that 
the institution preserves social peace and social order. As a safety valve 
would, acquisitive prescription alleviates the social pressure and 
temptation for possessors to engage in acts of self-help or even violence 
that could otherwise result from strict enforcement of property rights 
                                                                                                             
 49. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 46, at 320; PLANIOL, supra note 47, at 571–
72; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 27–29, at 16–19. 
 50. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 27, at 17 (citing Domat).  
 51. Id. § 28, at 17–18.  
 52. PLANIOL, supra note 47, at 571–72. 
 53. See discussion infra at notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 54. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 28, at 18. 




existing in paper titles only.55 Here, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier 
anticipate a modern strain of property theory that accounts for why, in the 
United States at least, adverse possession played an important role in 
resolving social tension on the American frontier in the 19th century.56 In 
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier’s final utilitarian calculus, the collective 
benefits favoring “social interest” served by acquisitive prescription 
clearly outweigh the demoralization costs that the institution might inflict 
on a few passive record owners.57 
B. The Concept of Precarious Possession in Roman and French Law 
The term “precarious possession” also emerged from Roman law. A 
Roman precarium was a specialized contract in which an owner allowed 
another person to possess or enjoy a thing on the condition that it would 
be returned at the owner’s demand.58 The notion that precarious possession 
has its origins in a contractual relationship is an important one, especially 
in cases involving certain express contractual relationships and even in cases 
in which the relationship between the parties emerges from an implied or 
tacit contractual relationship.59 
For Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, however, the concept of 
precarious possession in Roman law was still quite narrow: “[I]t qualified 
the possession of a person who received the thing with the authorization to 
use it, but with the duty to return it to the owner at his first request.”60 
Further, the holder precario in Roman law “was the possessor of the thing 
with respect to everyone except the person from whom he obtained it”; that 
is, the holder’s precarious possession was only a relative vice.61 Other 
persons holding for another, such as lessees or usufructuaries, whose rights 
of possession were not freely revocable and who did not owe a duty to 
return the thing to the owner on demand, would logically not be precarious 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. ¶ 29, at 18–19.  
 56. See EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY 
OUTLAWS 55–63 (2010); see also discussion infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 57. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 28, at 17–18.  
 58. A. N. Yiannopoulous, Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 552 (1991). See 
also NICHOLAS, supra note 30, at 151 (referring to the status of creditor holding 
collateral pursuant to a security contract as “precario”). 
 59. See infra Part II. 
 60. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 267, at 142 (emphasis 
added). 
 61. Id. 




possessors in this narrow sense.62 The glossators and canonists, however, 
are responsible for our current understanding of the term because they 
broadened the expression “precarious possessor” to refer to “all who 
possess for another and recognize a higher title.”63 
The concept of precarious possession was eventually codified in 
articles 2230 to 2232 and article 2236 of the French Civil Code of 1804,64 
and these articles in turn generated significant academic commentary. 
Four crucial ideas emerge from that commentary. 
1. True Possession Equals Detention Supplemented by Animus 
The first idea is commonplace. Possession in the true legal sense—the 
type of possession necessary for acquisitive prescription, that merits 
protection through a possessory action, and that generates any of the other 
derivative benefits of possession—depends on two crucial, but distinct, 
elements.65 The person claiming to be a possessor must have physical 
control of the thing, commonly referred to as “detention” or corpus, and 
the intent to possess as owner—that is, animus domini—or, to use the 
felicitous phrase that Professor Lee Hargrave gave us, the intent to possess 
“in the manner an owner would possess.”66 In short, a true possessor must 
have detention and the intent to possess as if the possessor were the owner 
or was on the way to becoming an owner.67 To this day, Louisiana law 
mirrors this understanding.68 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. (“Those holding for another were not considered precarious possessors 
in Roman law. Their status was defined by other expressions . . . .”).  
 63. Id. 
 64. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2230−2232, 2236 (John H. Crabb, 
trans., revised ed. 1995) (1804) (Fr.). 
 65. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 197, at 106 (stating 
that the definition of possession under article 2228 of the Code Napoleon applies 
only to those who have “animus domini”—the intent to “hold the thing as 
owners”—as well as “simple detention”). 
 66. Lee Hargrave, Ruminations on the Revision of the Louisiana Law of 
Acquisitive Prescription and Possession, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1215 (1999) 
[hereinafter Ruminations].  
 67. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier point out that that the definition of 
possession as “the detention of a thing by ourselves or through another person who 
holds it in our name” comes from Pothier. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra 
note 1, ¶ 194, at 105 (emphasis added). This definition was the foundation for article 
2228 of the Code Civil. Id.  
 68. Yiannopoulous, supra note 58, at 524−26 (noting that current articles 
3421 and 3424 of the Louisiana Civil Code must be read in pari materia to 
visualize these two essential elements of possession). 




2. Precarious Possession Cannot Produce Acquisitive Prescription 
The second essential idea depends directly on the first and remains 
uncontroversial. Precarious possession—possession on behalf of or for 
another person—can constitute only a form of detention and, therefore, 
cannot lead to acquisitive prescription on behalf of the precarious 
possessor.69 The reason precarious possession suffers from this disability 
is that the precarious possessor is not possessing as the master of the thing; 
that is, the precarious possessor is not usurping the prerogative and control 
of the true owner.70 To paraphrase the words of contemporary Canadian 
property law scholar Larissa Katz, the possession of a precarious possessor 
does not count because it does not challenge the agenda-setting authority 
of the owner with sufficient rigor or clarity.71 By contrast, a bad-faith 
possessor, a “usurper of land” who “knows that the thing belongs to 
another” and who is not possessing precariously on behalf of or with the 
permission of an owner, still can, according to Baudry-Lacantinerie and 
Tissier, possess with “an animus domini, for he pretends to be the owner 
and acts as if he were.”72 
3. Initial Presumption in Favor of Possession as Owner 
A third crucial idea to emerge from the French commentators, and in 
particular from Baudry-Lacantinere and Tissier, is especially important for 
this Article’s consideration of recent Louisiana cases. When a dispute 
arises between a record owner and a possessor–claimant, a court should 
initially presume that the claimant is possessing with the intent to become 
owner or possessing in the manner of an owner, unless the possession 
clearly began in a role that evidences the permissive, non-usurping 
character of a mere detainer or precarious possessor.73 The crucial text for 
                                                                                                             
 69. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 198, at 107 (noting 
that article 2236 of the Code Napoleon provides that precarious possessors can 
never prescribe, regardless of the length of time of their detention). 
 70. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier often reiterated this point in vivid terms. 
See, e.g., id. (“[s]imple holding” may give rise to certain rights but does not 
constitute a “genuine possession”).  
 71. Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty 
and Revolution in Property Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47 (2010). 
 72. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 265, at 141.  
 73. Id. ¶¶ 270–272, at 143–44. 




Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier is article 2230 of the Code Civil,74 an 
article that earned wild praise from the late nineteenth century German 
jurist Rudolf von Jhering, who considered it one of “the best and most 
felicitous” in French legislation,75 and that still serves as a direct analogue 
and source of current article 3427 of the Louisiana Civil Code.76  
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier acknowledge that the presumption that 
a possessor intends to possess as owner—or what they call the “presumption 
of non-precariousness in favor of all possessors”—can be destroyed by 
contrary evidence, such as proof of a title that makes the possession 
precarious,”77 or by a showing that the possession is “equivocal.”78 They also 
admit the competing influence of the presumption of continued precarious 
possession found in article 2231 of the Code Civil,79 the source of current 
article 3438 of the Louisiana Civil Code. For precarious possession to cease, 
                                                                                                             
 74. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2230 (John H. Crabb, trans., revised 
ed. 1995) (1804) (Fr.) (“One is always presumed to possess for oneself, and as 
owner, if it is not proved that one commenced to possess for another.”). 
 75. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 270, at 143. This article 
was, according to Jhering, “superior to anything the doctrine has produced in our 
whole century with regard to the distinction between possession and detention.” Id. 
at 143−44.  
 76. Current article 3427 reproduces the substance of article 3488 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 cmt. a (2016); see LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 3488 (Benjamin W. Dart. ed. 1947) (1870) (“As to the fact itself of 
possession, a person is presumed to have possessed as master and owner, unless it 
appears that the possession began in the name of and for another.”). Article 3488 
was based on article 3454 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, which was identical 
except that the word “owner” read “proprietor.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3454 (1825). 
The original codal source in Louisiana, article 39 of the Digest of 1808, read:  
A person is presumed to have possessed as master and proprietor, unless it 
appears that such possession began in the name of and for another, in 
which case the law supposes that the possession must have been continued 
for and in the name of said person, unless the contrary be shown. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3488 (1870) (Bejamin W. Dart ed. 1947) (citing C. CIV. art. 
2230 (Fr.) (1804)). Batiza concurred and also cited Article 12, Title XX, Book III 
of the Projet du Gouvernement as a source. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil 
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 132 
(1971). The revision comments to current article 3427 take the same position. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3427 cmt. c. 
 77. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 271, at 144. 
 78. Id. 
 79. To explain this second presumption, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier turn 
to Bigot-Preamenau who explained that “[a] person who holds for another continues 
and renews at every instant the possession of the person for whom he holds.” Id. ¶ 
272, at 144.  




the French Civil Code required an “interversion,” some act by the owner or 
by a third party that changed the status of the possession.80 Current Louisiana 
law basically continues this approach, although it allows the precarious 
possessor somewhat wider scope to terminate the vice of precariousness by 
communicating new intentions through “overt and unambiguous acts 
sufficient to give notice” if the precarious possessor is a co-owner or 
through “actual notice” if the precarious possessor is any other kind of 
precarious possessor.81 
4. Limited Juridical Effect of Acts Governed by Article 2232 of Code 
Civil 
The fourth crucial idea to emerge from the Code Civil and our French 
doctrinal sources finds expression in article 2232 of that code: “[a]cts of 
pure convenience and those of mere tolerance may establish neither 
possession nor prescription.”82 This Article refers to two categories of 
detention not exhibited by classic precarious possessors, such as lessees, 
depositaries, or usufructuaries. Because these acts of detention are too 
insignificant, too equivocal, or too harmless to be truly adverse to owners, 
the Code Civil implies that true owners must be tolerating such acts and 
therefore the acts are incapable of leading to acquisitive prescription. This 
important idea survived as an express rule of the Louisiana Civil Code until 
1982,83 when it was omitted in the most recent revision of the chapters 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. ¶ 273, at 144. See also id. ¶ 322, at 170−71 (noting that the “vice of 
precariousness is in principle indelible” in the sense that “the possessor can not 
eliminate it through his own will,” and thus it can only cease if “the conditions 
provided by Art. 2238 materialize”); id. ¶¶ 328–36, at 173−77 (elaborating on the 
various means by which precarious possession can be interverted). 
 81. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3439, 3478.  
 82. C. CIV. 2232 (Fr.) (1804), as translated in BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 274, at 145. Another translation of the article states: “Acts 
of pure license and simple toleration can lay no foundation either for possession 
or prescription.” C. CIV. art. 2232 (Barrister of the Inner Temple trans., 1804) 
(Fr.). In French, the article provides: “Les actes de pure faculté et ceux de simple 
tolérance ne peuvent fonder ni possession ni prescription.” C. CIV. art. 2232 (Fr.). 
 83. Article 3490 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided:  
The circumstance of having been in possession by the permission or 
through the indulgence of another person, gives neither legal possession 
nor the right of prescribing. 
Thus, those who possess precariously, that is, by having prayed the 
master to let them have the possession, do not deprive him thereof, but, 
possessing by his consent, they possess for him. 




addressing possession and acquisitive prescription. Of course, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Boudreaux resurrected this idea when the Court confronted 
a classic dispute between neighbors rather than a dispute between strangers or 
between an owner and someone possessing by virtue of a contractual or legal 
status relationship, such as a lessee or usufructuary.84 
a. Pure Facultative Acts 
The first category of ineffective acts referenced in article 2232—acts 
of pure “convenience,” “license,” or “faculty,” that is, “facultative acts”—
needs little discussion because this particular notion did not cross into the 
Louisiana Civil Code.85 The only important point about “acts of pure 
convenience” is that they cannot lead to prescription because the actor is 
not acting in the manner of a “ master” and no outward sign indicates that 
“two rights [are] in conflict.”86  
b. Acts of Simple Tolerance 
The second category of acts referenced by article 2232, acts of simple 
tolerance, is more important because it resurfaced prominently in Boudreaux,87 
and might arise in any other typical neighbor dispute. Examples of acts of 
simple tolerance noted by Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier include entering a 
                                                                                                             
Article 3456 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 and article 40 of the Digest of 
1808 contained identical language, with only slight variation in punctuation.  
 84. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 562−63 (La. 2015). 
 85. According to Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, “facultative acts” can be 
understood as acts that an owner undertakes on his own property that may affect 
another owner’s enjoyment of that owner’s property, but that do not lead to the 
acquisition of any prescriptive rights. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra 
note 1, ¶¶ 277–278, at 146–48. Admittedly, this statement sounds circular, but an 
example clarifies the idea. Presume owner A makes an opening in a wall that he 
owns and that happens to be contiguous to an adjacent estate owned by B and 
presume that the opening exists for 30 years. Id. This “facultative” act does not 
mean that owner A can prevent owner B from erecting a construction or planting 
a tree that might block the view out of the opening. Id. ¶ 277, at 146. A facultative 
act of this nature, which is “only an exercise of faculties given by the statutes, or 
a normal exercise of ownership rights,” cannot lead to acquisitive prescription 
because it does not diminish the rights of another owner, even if the other owner is 
passive for a long period. Id. ¶ 278, at 146. The rule in article 2232 regarding 
facultative acts can also be understood as a restatement of the principle that negative 
servitudes cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Id.  ¶ 278, at 147.  
 86. Id. ¶ 281, at 148.  
 87. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562–63. 




neighbor’s land to draw water from a well or to pick mushrooms from a 
forest.88 Although these acts represent more of “[an] encroachment” upon 
or challenge to the owner’s right to control the property than acts of pure 
convenience,89 they still do not lead to prescription because they do not 
cause any “appreciable damage to the other” and are not “sufficiently 
serious to represent a usurpation which should be repressed.”90 More 
importantly, these acts of simple tolerance are equated with “precarious 
concession” out of a need to coordinate social interaction.91 If owners were 
required to suppress them out of fear that prescription might start to run, 
“[g]ood neighborly relations would thus be upset.”92 Such acts of “simple 
toleration” can turn into acts of possession sufficient to lead to prescription 
if, as suggested in article 2238 of the Code Civil, some kind of 
“interversion in fact” occurs.93 But, absent such an interversion, the person 
who engages in acts of mere tolerance is more like a fiduciary with respect 
to the true owner. To terminate the possessor’s precariousness, this kind 
of possessor must clearly signal an intent to challenge the owner’s 
authority.94 
C. Louisiana Commentary After the 1982 Revision of the Civil Code  
In 1982, the Louisiana legislature enacted five revised chapters of the 
Civil Code to address occupancy, possession, and acquisitive prescription.95 
In addition to creating a more systematic and terse statement of this body of 
                                                                                                             
 88. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 1, ¶ 282, at 149. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. Baudry-Lacantiner and Tissier also provide this vivid example from 
French case law: a landowner allows a community to host a harvest festival on his 
land every year for more than 30 years. Id. Despite a plea of prescription, the 
landowner can stop the festival because the owner simply tolerated the use. Id. 
The community’s use of land was in its interest, but also in the landowner’s 
interest because the excrements deposited by animals fertilized his field. Id. These 
principles also reinforced the French Civil Code’s prohibition against acquisitive 
prescription of discontinuous servitudes. Id. Acts of quasi-possession that might 
be sufficient to establish exercise of an existing conventional servitude are not, 
from the perspective of a landowner, a substantial encroachment because they can 
also be explained as acts of simple tolerance. Id. ¶ 283, at 150.  
 93. For example, if a non-riparian landowner built exterior works across a 
riparian neighbor’s land to carry water to the non-riparian’s own estate for 
purposes of irrigation, this action might suffice. Id. ¶ 2861, at 151. 
 94. Katz, supra note 71, at 67. 
 95. 1982 La. Acts No. 187 (adopting LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3412−3491). 




law, the 1982 revision specifically clarified that the Civil Code rules 
regarding the attributes, vices, and tacking of possession apply not only in 
the context of acquisitive prescription, but also to the protection of 
possession in its own right.96 In the specific context of precarious 
possession, the revision succeeded in streamlining and consolidating many 
articles from the old law97 and made one substantive change: for the first 
time, Louisiana law clearly permitted a precarious possessor, “such as a 
lessee or depositary,” to bring a possessory action “against anyone except 
the person for whom he possesses.”98 
Soon after the revision came into effect, commentators began to point 
out problems. Professor Symeonides, for example, noted that the revised 
Civil Code articles addressing the means by which precarious possessors 
can terminate their precariousness create needless confusion.99 At the same 
time, Professor Lee Hargrave began to warn that revised articles 3427 and 
3438, which contain the two central presumptions governing possession 
                                                                                                             
 96. Symeon Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of 
Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA. L. REV. 69, 70−72 (1983). 
 97. Under the 1870 Civil Code, articles dealing with precarious possession 
were found in the chapter on possession in the subsection on ten-year acquisitive 
prescription and in the subsection on causes preventing acquisitive prescription, 
but under the revision, they appear primarily in the chapter on possession, LA. 
CIV. CODE arts. 3428−3429, 3437−2440 (2007), and in the title on prescription, 
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3477−2479 (2011). Symeonides, supra note 96, at 82 n.33. 
 98. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3440 (2007). This change effectively overrules article 
3656 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and brings Louisiana up to date 
with the modern approach taken in France and other civil law jurisdictions. LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3440 cmt. b−c (2007). See also C. CIV. arts. 2282−2283 (Fr.) 
(added in 1975). For more commentary and the view that “the granting of the 
possessory action to the lessee is really a specious gift,” see Symeonides, supra 
note 96, at 91 n.41. 
 99. Although the new rules set forth in articles 3439 and 3478 of the Civil 
Code confirmed pre-revision jurisprudence in some ways, Symeonides warned 
that the revision had created a needless, and perhaps illogical, distinction by 
allowing co-owners to terminate precarious possession through “overt and 
unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice,” while all other precarious possessors 
had to demonstrate “actual notice” of their intent to possess as owners. If any 
distinction was warranted, he noted, the “less exacting standard” should have been 
imposed on co-owners because they are less likely to arouse suspicion than other 
precarious possessors such as lessees. Symeonides, supra note 96, at 87 n.38. 




and precarious possession, were “circular”100 and “redundant,”101 
respectively. Missing from the revised Civil Code, Hargrave argued, was 
a clear statement of what he described as the “core rule,” which he stated 
in the following terms: 
The person alleging the precariousness of another’s possession 
has the burden of proving that fact. Proof that the possessor 
possessed for another discharges that burden. Once a precarious 
possession is established, the burden shifts to the precarious 
possessor who must then prove that he meets the requirements of 
Article 3439.102 
A dozen years later, Hargrave returned to these subjects and suggested 
that recent judicial decisions threatened to incorporate a requirement that 
possessors have a subjective belief that they are owners of the property 
they are possessing to be legitimate possessors.103 Hargrave disagreed with 
this approach because the Louisiana Civil Code, just like the Code Civil, 
clearly contemplates that legal possessors can, in fact, be in bad faith; that 
is, they “can know subjectively [they do] not own the thing.”104 All that 
the Civil Code actually requires, according to Hargrave, is that the 
possessor “must intend to possess in the manner an owner would 
possess.”105 In other words, the requirement of an intent to possess as 
owner must be interpreted objectively, in a manner that focuses not on 
what is taking place in the mind of the possessor, but rather on the “style 
of possessing.”106 When determining a possessor’s intentions, Hargrave 
                                                                                                             
 100. Lee Hargrave, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Louisiana Property 
Law, 46 LA. L. REV. 225, 236 (1985) [hereinafter Presumptions]. With respect to 
the presumption found in article 3427 stating that a possessor is presumed to 
possess as owner “unless he [the possessor] began to possess in the name of and 
for another,” Hargrave observed that “possession for another is the same thing 
that should be proved to disprove possessing as owner.” Id. 
 101. Id. at 237. The sole purpose of article 3438, Hargrave noted, was to open 
the door to application of the objective standards found in article 3439 for 
providing notice to the true owner of a precarious possessor’s newly formed 
acquisitive intentions. Id. at 236. Thus, article 3438 merely restates a rule of 
substantive law and does not truly provide a new presumption. Id. 
 102. Presumptions, supra note 100, at 237. 
 103. Ruminations, supra note 66. 
 104. Id. at 1215−16. 
 105. Id. at 1215. 
 106. Id. Hargrave located ample statutory authority for his objective approach to 
the question of intent to possess. In particular, he cited LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3660 




contended, a court should look at “circumstances” and “objective acts” to 
make reasonable inferences107 and should be careful to employ a “flexible 
definition of possessing as owner as not to defeat [the] institution” of 30-
year acquisitive prescription and “the reliance interests it protects.”108 
Hargrave’s primary example of the problematic judicial slide into 
subjectivity was the decision in Levy v. Germania Plantation.109 In this 
case, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that a possessor, 
who had physically occupied and used vacant farmland and woodland for 
more than 60 years but did not know the identity of the land’s true owner 
and did not pay rent to use the land, was nevertheless a precarious 
possessor because he realized only that he might have a claim to the land 
when a land man asked him to execute oil and gas leases.110 The holding 
in Levy, Hargrave warned, “virtually reads the concept of bad-faith 
possession out of the code and penalizes a layman for lack of knowledge 
of legal concepts.”111 In addition, it also misidentified the crucial question: 
“The issue was not whether [the possessor–claimant] thought he was 
owner, but whether he intended to possess as an owner would, that is, for 
himself rather than for another.”112 Hargrave’s discussion of Levy is now 
eerily prescient in light of the uncertainty created by Boudreaux v. 
Cummings.113 
                                                                                                             
(1998), stating that a possessor is a person who “possesses for himself, whether in 
good or bad faith, or even as usurper.” Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1216. 
 107. Id. at 1216. 
 108. Id. at 1217. 
 109. 395 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 110. Id. at 371. This admission, the court held, rebutted the “strong 
presumption under our law” that a possessor intends to possess for himself as 
owner, even though the claimant was “possessing the property in the same manner 
as he would have if he had had record title.” Id.  
 111. Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1217. 
 112. Id. The court in Levy was apparently aware that it was treading on thin 
ice. Absent the claimant’s candor, the court noted, “his claim was in perfect 
posture for him to reap the benefits of the presumption which our law grants unto 
a possessor.” Levy, 395 So. 2d at 371. The court in Levy also relied in part on 
Humble v. Dewey, a decision that Hargrave called “equally erroneous.” 
Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1217 n.177 (citing Humble v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d 
278, 382−83 (La. Ct. App. 1968)). 
 113. 167 So. 3d 559, 565 (La. 2015). 




D. The Virtues of Louisiana’s Two-Tier Model of Acquisitive 
Prescription 
Before moving on to a detailed consideration of Boudreaux and other 
Louisiana jurisprudence addressing the problem of precarious possession, this 
Article briefly pauses to reflect on the virtues of Louisiana’s two-tier 
institution of acquisitive prescription. These virtues are important to note not 
only because of Justice Knoll’s warning that the majority opinion in 
Boudreaux threatens to undermine the entire institution of acquisitive 
prescription in Louisiana,114 but also because adverse possession, acquisitive 
prescription’s common law twin, has been subjected to criticism in some 
American law reviews115 and has recently been modified by a few state 
legislatures.116 
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Carol N. Brown & Serena M. Williams, Rethinking Adverse 
Possession: An Essay on Ownership and Possession, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583 
(2010) (contending that adverse possession should be abrogated on fairness and 
efficiency grounds); Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad 
Faith” Acquisitive Prescription, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037 (2006) (arguing that 
only bad-faith possessors should be allowed to gain title and they should be 
required to document their intent to acquire ownership through an offer to 
purchase or by recording or registering notice of their aggressive intentions); 
Jeffery Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419 
(2001) (critiquing many of the traditional rationales offered in support of adverse 
possession); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 
79 CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1994) (arguing that U.S. adverse possession law leads to 
exploitation and destruction of wild lands and wilderness, and therefore adverse 
possession should not be applicable to wild lands). 
 116. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-101(3)(b)(II) (West 2016) 
(amended 2008) (allowing adverse possession only if adverse possessors “had a 
good faith belief [that they] w[ere] the actual owner of the property and the belief 
was reasonable under the particular circumstances”); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW 
§ 501(3) (McKinney 2016) (amended 2008) (requiring adverse possession 
claimant to show “a reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs to the 
adverse possessor”); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.45.052 (West 2016) (amended 
2003) (providing that in border cases, adverse possessors can prevail only if they 
have “a good faith but mistaken belief” that the property lay within the borders of 
their own land). New York also appears to have drastically curtailed adverse 
possession in border cases involving encroachments by enacting a conclusive 
presumption that all occupations of an adjoining property owner’s land are 
“permissive” unless the encroachments involve substantial structures. N.Y. REAL 
PROP. ACTS LAW § 543. For criticism of these developments, see Joseph W. 
Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1398 
(2013). 




First, Louisiana’s two-tier structure, in which ownership and other real 
rights in immovables can be acquired if the claimant proves ten years of 
continuous possession plus just title and good faith at the commencement 
of possession, or 30 years of possession with neither just title nor good 
faith, satisfies the crucial utilitarian ends of a “limitations model” of 
adverse possession.117 Just like the French doctrinal commentators whose 
justifications for acquisitive prescription were outlined in Part I.A.2,118 
many American property scholars have suggested that adverse possession 
is valuable because it too provides repose, clears title, and promotes 
certainty for long-term possessors.119  
Several variations of this limitations justification for adverse 
possession exist. In one version, adverse possession improves the 
efficiency and reliability of the judicial process by quickly disposing of 
claims based on lost, unreliable, or stale titles and potentially unreliable 
testimony about events in the distant past.120 Another version of this 
quieting title rationale focuses on how the institution protects a long-term 
possessor who possesses by virtue of some title or conveyance and who, 
when threatened by a person relying on an older instrument or conveyance, 
would otherwise have to prove a perfect chain of title back to the 
sovereign.121 Finally, a third version of the limitations rationale focuses on 
how adverse possession serves the interests of third parties and the 
property marketplace in general by providing an efficient and practical 
alternative to expensive title examinations or title insurance.122 
Some scholars have criticized the assumptions underlying these 
limitations rationales by noting the availability of alternative tools for 
quieting title—in particular marketable title acts and title insurance—and 
                                                                                                             
 117. Sprankling coined the term “limitations model” to describe a cluster of 
rationales for adverse possession. Sprankling, supra note 115, at 819. 
 118. See discussion supra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
 119. Sprankling observed that generally American property law views adverse 
possession as a “specialized application of the statute of limitations” that simply 
bars a suit by the disposed landowner to eject the adverse claimant. Sprankling, 
supra note 115, at 818. This dominant view, he claimed, is rooted in the same 
policies underlying any statute of limitations: “avoiding ‘stale claims’ and 
allowing repose.” Id. at 819. Other scholars have made similar arguments. See 
Henry Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 
NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1128−30 (1985) (articulating a cluster of rationales that 
generally relate to the limitations oriented goal of promoting legal certainty by 
quieting titles). 
 120. See Merrill, supra note 119, at 1128. 
 121. Id. 
 122. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 155 (1988). 




by pointing to the growing reliability of recording systems, land registries, and 
modern surveying techniques.123 Nevertheless, the limitations model still has 
important adherents among common law scholars, particularly those who 
emphasize its ability to reduce transaction costs and promote efficiency.124 In 
a similar fashion, Louisiana’s ten-year acquisitive prescription regime 
promotes legal certainty for good-faith possessors who have relied on a just 
title to fend off spurious claims based on old titles or brought by short-term 
possessors who may have seized possession coercively.125 Louisiana’s 30-
year acquisitive prescription regime also protects the interests of possessors 
who, for any number of sometimes understandable reasons, may not be able 
to prove good faith or just title, but who nevertheless have justifiable reliance 
interests based on their long-term possession of land. 
Second, Louisiana’s two-tier structure of acquisitive prescription 
responds to the moral concerns raised by critics of “bad-faith adverse 
possession” and by advocates of a narrower “administrative model” of 
adverse possession who believe these doctrines should be limited to helping 
or at least favoring reasonable, good-faith possessors who would otherwise be 
harmed by innocent conveyancing mistakes.126 Louisiana’s system responds 
                                                                                                             
 123. See Fennell, supra note 115, at 1063−64 (pointing to marketable title acts 
and title insurance); Stake, supra note 115, at 2441−49 (stressing that marketable 
title acts are a superior tool for quieting title, arguing that betterment acts can 
protect innocent encroachers, noting the increasing accuracy and inexpensiveness 
of surveys, and suggesting that “elimination of adverse possession would lead to 
even more careful recording of transactions”).  
 124. See Merrill, supra note 119, at 1129 (observing that even in an idealized 
world of universal and perfectly accurate recording systems and indestructible, 
perfectly measured property boundaries, adverse possession would be still be 
useful to third parties seeking to engage in property transactions because titles 
could still be clogged by old, outdated property interests, which would all have to 
be traced to their current successors before releases could be obtained and that 
this practice could lead to more exhausting title examinations, more negotiation 
and payoffs, and more expensive title insurance premiums). 
 125. See Douglas Nichols, Comment, The Publician Action, 69 TUL. L. REV. 217 
(1994) (discussing the difficult burden of proof facing a record owner bringing a 
petitory action against a party in possession created by Pure Oil v. Skinner, 294 So. 
2d 797 (La. 1974)); see also Baker v. Romero, 55 So. 3d 1035 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 126. See Merrill, supra note 119, at 1134, 1145−53 (arguing that property 
law’s interest in “punishing or deterring those who engage in purely coercive 
transfers of property” justifies a change in the law whereby owners who lose title 
to their land through adverse possession to “bad faith” possessors would have a 
right to seek just compensation for the value of the land lost at the time the 
claimant’s adverse possession began); Helmholz, supra note 26 (arguing that 
American courts routinely favor good-faith possessors over bad-faith possessors). 




to these concerns by giving possessors who can demonstrate both an 
objectively reasonable belief that they own the land they are possessing 
and a just title describing all of the property in dispute a substantially 
shorter prescriptive period to endure before their possession ripens into 
ownership of other real rights. At the same time, by utilizing a much longer 
prescriptive period—30 years, an entire generation—for possessors who 
cannot meet either of these requirements, Louisiana’s system respects the 
moral objections that acquisitive prescription might transfer title too easily 
to possessors who either intentionally possess land they know they do not 
own or at least possess it carelessly.127 Also noteworthy is that by 
transferring title to either kind of possessor at the end of the respective 
prescriptive period without any compensation to the record owner, 
Louisiana’s system also avoids the complicated and perhaps intractable 
problem of determining just compensation that a liability rule approach to 
adverse possession would entail, regardless of whether such an approach 
applied to only bad-faith acquisitive prescription or to both forms.128 
Third, just as Planiol and Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier observed in 
France,129 Louisiana’s acquisitive prescription fulfills the objectives 
associated with what American scholars call the “development model” of 
adverse possession.130 It does so by shifting title from a passive or even a 
negligent record owner, who has failed to put his property to productive 
use or to monitor the property, to the industrious or diligent possessor, who 
                                                                                                             
 127. See Fennell, supra note 115, at 1048−49 (summarizing the moral disapproval 
showered on “bad faith possessors”).  
 128. Richard Epstein made precisely this point in assessing Merrill’s proposal 
to convert the remedial structure of adverse possession from a universal “property 
rule” mechanism to a “liability rule” mechanism for bad-faith adverse possessors. 
Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of 
Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 685−89 (1986). In Epstein’s view, a longer 
statute of limitations for bad-faith possessors would satisfy moral qualms about 
allowing adverse possession to benefit land thieves too easily, but it would still 
serve the instrumental objectives of quieting title and promoting legal certainty. 
Id. at 686−89. Epstein disapproved of Merrill’s liability rule solution to the 
dilemma of bad-faith adverse possession because liability rules that require courts 
to determine the objective value of property are “costly to administer and undercut 
the security of transactions concern that lies at the base of the [adverse possession] 
rule.” Id. at 689. 
 129. See discussion supra notes 51−54 and accompanying text.  
 130. Sprankling, supra note 115, at 816. Sprankling argued that over the 
course of the 19th and 20th centuries, American courts transformed adverse 
possession from “a mechanism designed to protect the title of the true owner 
against false claims into a tool designed to transfer title to wild lands from the 
idle true owner to the industrious adverse possessor.” Id. at 821.  




has taken charge of vacant property and often put it to some higher value 
use,131 or has at least “set an agenda” for the property and took pains to make 
sure that others respect that agenda.132 Also, just as the French doctrinal 
writers pointed out a century ago,133 Louisiana’s two-tier structure of 
acquisitive prescription still performs the important societal function of 
aligning actual title with community expectations and assumptions about 
who deserves to be treated as the owner.134 
Finally, Louisiana’s two-tier acquisitive prescription regime allows its 
property law to honor the powerful psychological and emotional attachments 
that possessors can develop with regard to a thing they possess for a long 
                                                                                                             
 131. See Fennell, supra note 115, at 1040 (the “niche goal of adverse 
possession” is the task of “moving land into the hands of parties who value it 
much more highly than do the record owners”); Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1113 (2011) (adverse possession promotes efficient 
development by “encouraging careful contracting, reducing land title conflicts, 
[and] rewarding productive uses of scarce resources”); Sally Brown Richardson, 
Abandonment and Adverse Possession, 52 HOUSTON L. REV. 1386 (2015) 
(arguing for relaxation of corporeal possession requirement to allow adverse 
possessors to obtain title to abandoned property); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 
122 (justifying adverse possession because, inter alia, it specifies “procedures for 
a productive user to take title from an unproductive one”); Merrill, supra note 
119, at 1130 (referring to this general cluster of rationales as punishing those who 
“sleep on their rights” by ignoring their property or otherwise engaging in “poor 
custodial practices”); GORDLEY, supra note 41, at 141 (contending that the most 
persuasive justification for adverse possession and acquisitive prescription is to 
transfer title from an absent, passive owner—from “an owner who has not 
behaved like an owner and has not even checked to see how his land is being 
used”—to a possessor who is “putting [the land] to use”).  
 132. See generally Katz, supra note 71, at 67−70 (defending adverse possession 
because it identifies objects that are subject to an agenda-setting vacancy and assures 
that there is always an individual with “agenda-setting authority” in control of a 
thing). Similarly, Gordley suggests that the problem solved by adverse possession 
or acquisitive prescription arises when the record owner “has made no such decision 
at all” with respect to the property and the owner’s lack of attention “has only 
muddled titles.” GORDLEY, supra note 41, at 144. 
 133. See discussion supra notes 49−56 and accompanying text. 
 134. PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 56, at 55–63 (recounting how the men 
and women who settled the American frontier, often without the benefit of formal 
title to the land they settled, came to be treated as heroic or at least strategic 
adverse possessors who successfully resisted the federal land distribution policies 
of the United States government in the first half of the 19th century). 




period of time,135 and to the related reliance interests136 and endowment effect 
interests137 that build up in long-term possessors. In short, just as adverse 
possession does, acquisitive prescription helps to stabilize Louisiana property 
law, but it also preserves the ability to respond flexibly to discrepancies 
between long-term possession and paper titles. 
                                                                                                             
 135. Drawing on Kant, Hegel, and probably Bentham, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
first stated this idea in O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 207 (1881) 
(“Possession is to be protected because a man by taking possession of an object 
has brought it within the sphere of his will.”), and expanded it in O.W. Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“A thing which you have 
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, 
takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act 
and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.”). Margaret Radin 
extended Holmes’s idea with her own theory of “property and personhood.” 
Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession and Alienation, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 739, 
741 (1986) (asserting that a person’s “claim to an owned object grows stronger 
as, over time, the holder becomes bound up with the object,” and “[c]onversely, 
the claim [of a record owner] to an object grows weaker as the will (or 
personhood) is withdrawn”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE LAW 78–79 (7th ed. 2007) (restating Holmes’s theory with an “economic 
explanation” cast in terms of Benthamite pleasure and pain). 
 136. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property Law, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 614, 666–67 (1988); Merrill, supra note 119, at 1131 (also identifying 
“the reliance interest” justification for adverse possession and noting at least three 
alternative variations). Although he notes that the reliance interest rationale 
contradicts “the interest of a T[itle] O[wner] and society generally in preserving 
the integrity of the set of entitlements grounded in law,” id. at 1132, Merrill 
ultimately endorses the rationale by suggesting a fourth version—the reliance 
interests of third parties who have an interest in being able to assume, without 
expensive and time-consuming title examinations, that the person who has been 
in long term possession of property actually has title to the property. Id. Merrill 
calls this the right to rely on the “appearance of title.” Id.  
 137. Jeffery Stake makes a powerful case for the continuing viability of 
adverse possession by updating Holmes’s “roots” rationale and Radin’s 
personality theory version through the experimental psychology concept known 
as “the endowment effect” and its close cousin “loss-aversion” theory. Stake, 
supra note 115. Stake argues that “people become more attached to tangible 
physical assets than to financial assets and feel a greater sense of loss when 
deprived of tangible physical objects than when deprived of intangibles that have 
the same value to a purchaser.” Id. at 2463. Stake sums up his argument for an 
endowment effect understanding of adverse possession by observing that many 
adverse possession disputes are really contests between two relatively innocent 
parties and that when forced to choose which party has to bear a loss, adverse 
possession simply and sensibly “choses to deprive R[ecord] O[wner] of his financial 
asset rather than deprive A[dverse] P[ossessor] of her tangible asset.” Id. at 2471. 




II. THREE PARADIGMATIC POSSESSION AND ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION 
DISPUTES: A SOCIAL AND RELATIONAL APPROACH 
Multiple property law scholars have suggested that adverse possession 
and acquisitive prescription disputes should be viewed from perspectives 
other than traditional doctrinal categories. Thirty years ago, Margaret 
Radin divided adverse possession cases into three paradigms: “color of 
title,” “boundaries,” and “squatters” cases.138 In the first, the possessor 
holds an “invalid document of title and eventually has to defend against 
the ‘true owner’ or someone claiming under her.”139 In a “boundaries” 
case, “the boundary line observed by neighboring property owners in 
practice does not correspond with what their documents say,” and 
eventually one of the neighbors litigates to address the discrepancy.140 
Finally, in a “squatters” case, “aggressive trespassers” take over plots of 
ground and treat it as their own.141 Although Radin’s three paradigms hint 
at the social relationships between the parties, her categories are primarily 
defined by the structure of legal and moral problems confronting courts in 
each type of case. Also, Radin generated her paradigms for the limited 
purpose of demonstrating why her “personality theory” of property 
explained a statutory or judicial preference for good-faith over bad-faith 
possessors.142 
More recently, James Smith has suggested that an emerging body of 
law under the heading of the “law of neighbors” can be understood more 
clearly if scholars and courts distinguish between cases in which the 
parties are absolute strangers to one another and cases in which the parties 
are friends or enjoy some special relationship with each other.143 Smith 
argues that application of a “stranger model” and a “friend model” could 
help make sense of some of the specialized presumptions and burdens of 
                                                                                                             
 138. Radin, supra note 135, at 746. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. Without any empirical support, Radin asserted that “color of title” and 
“boundaries” cases were much more common than “squatters” cases. Id. 
 142. Id. at 749. In Radin’s view, it is quite natural that courts and legislators 
would favor mistaken good-faith claimants because they develop bonds more 
quickly with the land they possess, as they already believe they own it. Following 
Hegel, however, Radin acknowledged that even squatters or bad-faith possessors 
can, over time, develop strong psychological bonds of their own with the thing 
possessed. Id. 
 143. James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors, 
39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 757, 758–60 (2011). 




proof that courts in the United States have developed to deal with problems 
of permissive use in adverse possession cases.144 
Building on Radin’s and Smith’s paradigms, this Article proposes that 
the Louisiana legal community should view its own body of acquisitive 
prescription jurisprudence as consisting of three categories of cases. The 
first category consists of cases in which the parties are in fact strangers to 
one another. Although the nature of a possessor’s claim could grow out of 
a conveyance error or confusion over a boundary location or could result 
from a more aggressive assertion of dominion, the most salient 
characteristic of a “stranger” case is that the parties do not share a 
preexisting relationship. Although they may own adjacent tracts of land, 
they are not neighbors in the sense of inhabiting neighboring lots or 
belonging to the same neighborhood community. In a “stranger” case, the 
true owner is often an absentee owner who does not live on or near the 
land and does not regularly use or visit the land in dispute. In these cases, 
the existing presumptions and burdens of proof found in the Louisiana 
Civil Code, despite the infirmities noted by Professor Hargrave, work well 
enough and generally produce consistent or stable results. In a “stranger” 
case, courts will usually characterize the claimant–possessor as possessing 
as owner and only rarely as a precarious possessor. 
In the second category of cases, the parties are not strangers, but are 
linked to one another by a preexisting contractual relationship or some 
special legal status relationship. In these cases, courts classify the possessor–
claimant as a precarious possessor at the outset of the possession. The 
crucial question then becomes when, if ever, the precarious possessor has 
terminated the precarious possession and begun to possess as owner. 
Although the results of these contractual and legal status cases are less 
predictable than “stranger” cases, still the presumptions and burdens of 
proof provided by Louisiana Civil Code articles 3427, 3438, 3439, and 
3478 operate effectively.145 By using these tools and developing some of 
their own jurisprudential rules of thumb, Louisiana courts have been able 
to produce outcomes that are sensitive to the particular contractual or 
social relationship that initially bound the parties together. 
The third category of cases involves true neighbors—persons who 
actually live near to each other and know one another or at least belong to 
the same close-knit community. Despite these neighborly ties, the parties 
                                                                                                             
 144. Id. at 760−63. For another example of an insightful contextualized 
approach to understanding conflicts in adverse possession law, see Luke Meier, A 
Contextual Approach to Claim of Right in Adverse Possession Cases: On Van 
Valkenburgh v. Lutz, Bad Faith and Mistaken Boundaries, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 47, 53–54 (2015). 
 145. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3427, 3438, 3439, 3478 (2016). 




in a neighbor dispute do not have any other preexisting contractual, family, 
or legal status relationship. When courts confront this third kind of case, 
the outcomes tend to be more unpredictable. In these cases, significant 
equitable considerations are in tension with one another. In a neighbor 
case, the court will often focus as much on the assumptions and 
expectations that the true owner may have reasonably developed based on 
the specific nature of the neighbor relationship as on the state of mind and 
expectations of the claimant–possessor. It is precisely in these cases that 
the existing framework of presumptions provided by articles 3427 and 
3438 of the Louisiana Civil Code proves to be the most inadequate. To 
remedy this deficiency, Part III of this Article proposes that Louisiana law 
would be well served by the development of a new presumption of sharing 
and corresponding indicia of giving or renunciation that could help courts 
analyze these inherently difficult cases with greater contextual and 
relational sensitivity. 
A. Strangers 
Louisiana courts are most confident in resolving precarious possession 
defenses in cases in which the claimant–possessor and record owner are true 
strangers to one another, that is, when the person asserting possession in a 
possessory action or acquisitive prescription in some other procedural setting 
has no relationship at all with the record owner. In some stranger cases, the 
claimant–possessor is an opportunistic trespasser, a person who observes that 
a parcel of land is unused, unfenced, and not actively monitored by anyone 
and begins to engage in active corporeal possession.146 In some stranger cases, 
however, claimants may have an honest, though mistaken, belief that they 
own the land in dispute but cannot prove a just title describing all of the land 
and thus must rely on 30-year, rather than ten-year, acquisitive prescription.147 
As this Section will show, in most paradigmatic stranger cases, courts 
                                                                                                             
 146. See, e.g., Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 
1975); Brunson v. Hemmler, 989 So. 2d 246 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Charles Tolmas, 
Inc. v. Lee, 903 So. 2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Williams v. McEacharn, 464 So. 2d 
20 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 862 So. 2d. 1010 (La. Ct. 
App. 2003); St. John Baptist Church of Phoenix v. Thomas, 1 So. 3d 618, 62226 (La. 
Ct. App. 2008), all discussed infra notes 153–88 and accompanying text. 
 147. Many boundary actions, especially in boundary tacking actions arising 
under article 794 of the Civil Code, fall into this latter subcategory. See, e.g., 
Loutre Land & Timber Co., 63 So. 3d 120, 122−26 (La. 2011) (holding that 
plaintiff timber company was owner of disputed strip of land where both parties 
had received a title from same succession but plaintiff could rely on boundary 
tacking to claim ownership via thirty year acquisitive prescription). 




apply the foundational presumption set forth in article 3427 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code—that “[o]ne is presumed to intend to possess as 
owner unless he began to possess in the name of and for another”—in a 
robust fashion. In fact, resolution of stranger cases often will turn on other 
issues, for example, when the claimant’s possession began or whether it 
was afflicted with any of the other vices of possession. 
A claimant–possessor will not always prevail in what at first blush 
looks like a stranger case. Occasionally, a court will find an apparent 
stranger–claimant to be a precarious possessor.148 Sometimes this holding 
occurs when a court finds that a claimant, at least at the commencement of 
possession, had a contractual or legal status relationship with the record 
owner149 and sometimes when the claimant appeared to possess through 
the neighborly toleration of the record owner.150 In other words, courts 
sometimes reclassify apparent stranger disputes as belonging to one of the 
other two categories of possession and acquisitive prescription disputes. 
Finally, in a few stranger cases, courts simply misapply the law. Just as 
Professor Hargrave warned years ago,151 courts sometimes make the 
mistake of classifying claimants as precarious possessors when in fact they 
are simply straightforward bad-faith possessors who possess as if they 
were the owner because they are on the road to acquisition of ownership 
through possession but are not yet the true owners.152 
1. Stranger–Claimant Possessed as Owner 
In the vast majority of reported possession and acquisitive prescription 
decisions in which the parties are actual strangers to one another, Louisiana 
courts correctly focus on objective circumstances and routinely find that the 
claimant–possessor is possessing as owner and not as a precarious 
                                                                                                             
 148. See discussion of cases infra notes 189−202 and accompanying text. 
 149. See, e.g., Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La. Ct. App. 1980) 
(observing that landowner’s caretaker “gave plaintiff-appellant permission to run 
his cattle on the land without payment of rent by Harper if Harper would look 
after the property, keep the fire out and the brush down,” thus effectively 
classifying the possessor as an implied licensee or agent of the record owner and 
thus not a true possessor because of his quasi-contractual relationship). 
 150. Buckley v. Dumond, 156 So. 784, 788 & 790 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (finding 
that neighboring claimant “did not have ‘the intention of possessing as owner’” 
and his trapping was a “mere toleration on the part of the plaintiff”), discussed 
infra notes 189−90 and accompanying text. 
 151. Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1217. 
 152. See, e.g., Levy v. Germania Plantation, Inc., 395 So. 2d 366, 371 (La. Ct. 
App. 1981); McCoy v. Toms, 384 So. 2d 518, 519−22 (La. Ct. App. 1980), both 
discussed infra notes 198−202 and accompanying text. 




possessor. A classic example of this approach is Liner v. Louisiana Land 
and Exploration Co.,153 the 1975 Louisiana Supreme Court decision that 
serves as the foundation for our modern understanding of the concept of 
the “right to possess” and the requirements for bringing a possessory 
action. Although Justice Albert Tate’s rich doctrinal explanation in Liner 
of why a possessor’s “right to possess” is not lost as the result of a mere 
disturbance-in-fact during the year preceding the assertion of a possessory 
action is often considered the case’s focal point,154 the case also represents 
a classic example of the unfolding of adverse possession. In particular, 
recall that the record owner in Liner, the Louisiana Land & Exploration 
Company (“LL&E”), failed to demonstrate any plausible claim that the 
possession of Liner or his ancestors-in-possession was precarious.155 In 
fact, despite an earlier case involving nearby swampland in which the 
claimant was characterized as a precarious possessor,156 the Supreme 
Court in Liner held that the Liner family possessed as owners, not as 
precarious possessors.157 The reasons behind this holding were several. 
Despite holding no record title to the swampy, roughly 3,000 by 7,000 
foot tract of marshland in dispute, which was adjacent to a tract the Liners 
did own by title, Liner and his ancestors engaged in numerous acts of 
possession that revealed “the quality of his [and their] possession was that 
of owner.”158 These acts included: occupation of houses prior to 1909; 
occupation of a camp for three or four months every year during trapping 
season for 56 years; annual farming, cattle raising, and trapping; erecting 
fences and later maintaining boundaries with the use of stakes and 
markers; the mysterious act of “burning the marsh”; granting a gas 
company a pipeline right of way; Oliver’s appropriation of a ditch that 
LL&E had constructed on its claimed boundary line so that he could 
provide a fresh water source for his own cattle; 159 and, of course, the 
famous battle of the stakes, which helped Oliver preserve his right to 
possess during the crucial year preceding his filing of the possessory 
                                                                                                             
 153. Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975). 
 154. Id. at 779–83 (Tate, J., concurring).  
 155. Plainly, LL&E made such an assertion because the majority opinion went out 
of its way to hold that “the quality of his [Liner’s] possession was that of owner. . . . It 
was neither precarious, clandestine, violent nor ambiguous.” Id. at 774. 
 156. Buckley v. Dumond, 156 So. 784 (La. Ct. App. 1934), discussed infra 
notes 189−90 and accompanying text. 
 157. Liner, 319 So. 2d at 769.  
 158. Id. at 774. 
 159. Id. at 769–70. 




action.160 In light of these actions, Justice Dixon could sum up the nature 
of the Liner family’s possession in these terms: “the quality of his 
possession was that of owner. It extended to visible boundaries. It was 
neither precarious, clandestine, violent, nor ambiguous.”161 
Nowhere in the record was there any indication of a real neighbor 
relationship between the Liners and the record owners. Although they 
owned neighboring tracts of land, they were, for all intents and purposes, 
strangers to each other—that is, until LL&E appeared in the year before 
the filing of the possessory action and began challenging Liner’s 
boundaries. 
Although Justice Dixon’s opinion in Liner cited Buckley v. Dumond,162 
a case in which the possession of two claimants to neighboring swampland 
similar to the land in dispute in Liner was characterized as precarious, Dixon 
did not bother to distinguish that case in any detail.163 A quick review reveals 
why. First, the claimants’ activities and improvements in Buckley were more 
transitory than in Liner.164 Second, the record owner in Buckley maintained 
his presence on the land in dispute through the actions of a hunting and 
trapping lessee.165 The active presence of this lessee, who posted the 
property with signs forbidding entrance and actively tried to keep intruders 
away, suggests that the court in Buckley visualized the parties as two 
neighbors, with the defendant–claimant engaged in trapping through the 
“mere tolerance” of the record owner plaintiffs.166 By contrast, the acts of 
possession exhibited by the Liners seem to epitomize the kind of 
revolutionary challenge to the agenda-setting authority of the true owner 
that some scholars say is essential for real adverse possession or 
acquisitive prescription to prevail.167 
                                                                                                             
 160. Id. at 773–74. The Court also noted the Liner family’s reliance on the 
land as its primary source of income and the important fact that other trappers in 
the community recognized the Liners’ boundaries. Id. at 770. 
 161. Id. at 774. 
 162. Buckley v. Dumond, 156 So. 784 (La. Ct. App. 1934). 
 163. Justice Dixon merely stated that “[u]nlike the defendants in Buckley v. 
Dumond, which involved neighboring swampland, the Liner family possessed as 
owners.” Liner, 319 So. 2d at 769 (citing Buckley, 154 So. 784). 
 164. In Buckley, the claimant only trapped and grazed cattle. His 
improvements consisted of only a small ditch to facilitate trapping activities and 
a camp that served as temporary shelter for hunting and trapping. Id. at 788–90. 
 165. Id. at 788−90. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Katz, supra note 71, at 63–79; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra 
note 1, ¶ 282, at 149 (acts of the possessor must be “sufficiently serious to 
represent a usurpation which should be repressed”).  




After Liner, in a series of stranger cases decided over the last three 
decades, Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly held that long-term 
possessors in fact possessed with the intent to own, even though record 
owners attempted to discredit their possession as being merely precarious. 
The courts often reached this conclusion because of the lack of any 
meaningful relationship between the possessor and record owner; that is, 
because the parties were strangers. In one case, the appellate court reversed 
a trial court finding that the possession was precarious in a dispute in 
which the parties owned adjoining tracts of land but did not know each 
other.168 In that decision, the court described article 3427 as creating a 
“strong legal presumption” that a possessor possesses as owner, a 
presumption that the hearsay testimony of a deceased possessor’s alleged 
declaration against interest almost 20 years before the litigation could not 
rebut, especially when the claimant’s possession was “established by the 
lengthy use of the property.”169 In another case, the appellate court 
affirmed a trial court ruling that the adverse possessors established 30-year 
acquisitive prescription against a corporation that had purchased the land 
in dispute situated on the bank of a navigational canal from a record owner 
who had ignored the claimants’ extensive use of the land as a commercial 
campsite.170 There, citing article 3427, the court observed that a 
possessor’s intent to possess as owner “may be inferred from all of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances”171 and concluded, in the absence of 
any relationship between the parties, that the claimants acted as the sole 
owner of the land in dispute.172 In yet another case, a claimant church 
established acquisitive prescription against a handful of descendants of the 
original record owners who had purchased the land for the benefit of the 
church.173 The claimant church defeated the allegation of precarious 
possession made by the record owners’ descendants by pointing to its 100-
year history of allowing families to live on the property and otherwise 
acting as if it were the owner for purposes of dealing with third parties, the 
State of Louisiana, and local government.174 In other words, even if the 
adverse possessor and record owner initially enjoyed a close relationship, 
when that relationship disintegrates such that the actual parties to the dispute 
are strangers, precarious possession does not constitute a meaningful defense. 
                                                                                                             
 168. Williams v. McEacharn, 464 So. 2d 20, 2224 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 169. Id. at 24.  
 170. Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 862 So. 2d 1010 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 
 171. Id. at 1015. 
 172. Id. at 1020. 
 173. St. John Baptist Church of Phoenix v. Thomas, 1 So. 3d 618, 62226 (La. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
 174. Id. at 622. 




In one particularly clear example of this jurisprudence constante,175 the 
case of Brunson v. Hemler,176 the adverse possessors established ownership 
of 60 acres of rural land by proving that they and their ancestors possessed 
the land in dispute since at least 1936 by planting crops, raising cattle, 
fencing and enclosing the land, and regularly clearing the woods.177 The 
record owners—a private trust and two universities—had much less 
significant contact with the land. Indeed, only one of the defendants could 
testify about ever visiting the land, a visit that had reportedly occurred 43 
years before the litigation.178 Citing two other decisions,179 the record 
owners asserted that the claimants were precarious possessors who must 
provide “some kind of direct or dual notice” before acquisitive 
prescription could begin.180 Rejecting this plea, the court of appeal held 
that “the testimony yields no indication that Plaintiffs and their ancestors-
in-title occupied and used the disputed property in any capacity other than 
as owners”181 and concluded that the presumption of article 3427 that a 
possessor intends to possess as owner was “not rebutted.”182 In Brunson, 
the court refused to muddy the waters of the plaintiffs’ acquisitive 
prescription claim with precarious possession because the parties were, in 
short, utter strangers to one another. 
Finally, Charles Tolmas, Inc. v. Lee183 presents a striking example of 
a successful urban squatter who laid claim to a vacant lot next door to his 
business, eventually acquired most of it by 30-year acquisitive prescription 
and, along the way, overcame the allegation made by the undisputed 
record owner that his possession was tolerated as a neighborly 
accommodation.184 In Tolmas, the trial court ruled that the claimant’s 
                                                                                                             
 175. Jurisprudence constante refers to the practice of Louisiana courts giving 
deference, but not being blindly subservient to, a series of prior judicial decisions 
by the same or a higher-level court. Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian 
Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. 
REV. 1369, 1372 (1988). 
 176. Brunson v. Hemler, 989 So. 2d 246 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
 177. Id. at 24951.  
 178. Id. at 251.  
 179. See Humble v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1968), discussed 
infra at notes 31023 and accompanying text; Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299 
(La. Ct. App. 1980), discussed infra at notes 191−97 and accompanying text. 
 180. Brunson, 989 So. 2d at 251. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 903 So. 2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 184. The record owner, Charles Tolmas, Inc., sued in 1998 seeking a judicial 
declaration that the defendant, Calvin Lee—and after his death, his estate—had 
no ownership interest in a vacant parcel situated on Metairie Road, a well-




possession of the vacant lot had been open, continuous, unequivocal, and 
uninterrupted for 47 years and therefore that the claimant acquired 
ownership of most of the lot by acquisitive prescription.185 The court of 
appeal affirmed, rejecting the record owner’s arguments that the claimant 
had not sufficiently enclosed the property and “that [the Tolmas family] 
knew the area was being used for parking by the Lees, but they did not 
complain because they were trying to be neighborly.”186 Responding to the 
latter contention of precarious possession, the court emphasized the open 
and public nature of the claimant’s possession and, just as important, the 
record owner’s awareness of and passivity toward the claimant’s use of 
the land.187 
Although it did not cite article 3427 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the 
court in Tolmas clearly ruled as if the burden of proving precariousness 
rested with the record owner, and the court was thus unwilling to give 
much credence to the record owner’s ex post claim that it had merely been 
tolerating the claimant’s use as a neighborly accommodation.188 The 
court’s lack of sympathy for the precariousness defense can be explained 
by the lack of any real neighborly relationship between the parties. 
Although their lots may have been adjacent to one another, the two 
families involved in the conflict—the Lees and the Tolmases—were not 
neighbors in the traditional sense. On the busy commercial corridor of 
Metairie Road in suburban New Orleans, the two families in this case 
essentially ignored each other until the record owner instituted its lawsuit in 
1998, by which time, the court found, acquisitive prescription had run. In 
sum, just like many of the other stranger cases, Tolmas demonstrates that 
when parties in a possession or acquisitive prescription suit are actually 
nothing more than strangers to one another, an allegation of precarious 
possession by the record owner is unlikely to prevail. 
2. Stranger–Claimant as Precarious Possessor 
Occasionally a court will classify a person who appears to be a classic 
stranger–claimant as a precarious possessor. This classification typically 
                                                                                                             
traversed commercial corridor in the suburbs of New Orleans. Id. at 662. Lee 
operated a dry-cleaning business on a lot next door to the vacant Tolmas lot that 
he owned and on which he had constructed a building in 1951. Id. In 1951, Lee’s 
customers and employees began using a triangular shaped area on the Tolmas lot 
to park their vehicles. Id. 
 185. Id. at 664. 
 186. Id. at 665. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.  




happens because the court views the case as falling into one of the other 
paradigm possession or acquisitive prescription categories. In other 
instances, a court will simply give undue weight to an inadvertent 
testimonial admission. In Buckley v. Dumond,189 the court of appeal held 
that claimants who trapped animals, grazed cattle, and built a few minor 
and temporary improvements on undeveloped swampland were really 
possessing with the mere tolerance of the record owner, who had leased 
the land in dispute to another trapper who actively monitored the land.190 
In a sense, the court in Buckley viewed the parties as neighbors and 
members of the same close-knit community, rather than as strangers. 
In another well-known decision that arguably involves strangers, 
Harper v. Willis,191 the claimant in a possessory action, Harper, physically 
possessed three lots that were part of a failed subdivision development on 
the outskirts of Alexandria, Louisiana for more than 30 years by grazing 
cattle on the land.192 Although Harper’s physical occupation of the land 
began around 1939, sometime thereafter a caretaker of the property for a 
purported owner reportedly gave Harper permission to run cattle on the 
land rent-free “if Harper would look after the property, keep the fire out 
and brush down.”193 After the caretaker abandoned his duties, Harper 
“took over the property in 1947.”194 The only other contact between 
Harper and a record owner occurred in 1960 when Harper wrote a letter to 
an apparent record owner offering to buy one of the lots in dispute.195 
Based on these facts and a review of his deposition testimony, the 
court concluded that Harper lacked the requisite intent to possess as owner 
sufficient for a possessory action.196 Relying heavily on Buckley, the court 
repeatedly emphasized that Harper’s own candid testimony, in which he 
admitted, for example, that he never intended to “take” the property or 
“beat anybody out of anything,” proved that he lacked the intent to possess 
as owner, despite considerable objective evidence that he was acting in the 
                                                                                                             
 189. 156 So. 784 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (showing that Buckley brought a similar 
suit against Theriot, and the two cases were consolidated). 
 190. Id. at 78890. 
 191. Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
 192. Id. at 130102. Harper testified that although a fence did not surround the 
three lots in dispute, there was a fence around the entire two sections of land that 
constituted the larger “Old Pecan Orchard Subdivision.” Id. Harper apparently had 
acquired many of the other lots in the subdivision in the period between the 
commencement of his physical possession and the time of the litigation. Id. at 1301. 
 193. Id. at 1301. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 1302. 
 196. Id. at 130207. 




manner of an owner. Perhaps the best way to understand Harper, then, is 
to acknowledge that the caretaker’s purported grant of permission to 
Harper, vague and uncertain as it was, created a contractual relationship 
between Harper and the record owner—that of principal and agent—placing 
this case in this Article’s second category of possession and acquisitive 
prescription disputes.197 
Finally, sometimes a court will simply make a poor judgment in what 
otherwise appears to be a classic stranger case. In Levy v. Germania 
Plantation,198 the decision that Professor Hargrave worried might read bad-
faith acquisitive prescription out of the Civil Code, the court characterized 
a claimant as a precarious possessor based solely on one naïve cross-
examination statement even though the claimant was completely unaware 
of the identity of the true owner of the land in dispute.199 In Levy, both the 
trial and appellate courts admitted that but for this ill-advised but candid 
statement, the claimant would have prevailed under the normal 
presumptions of the Civil Code because from an objective viewpoint, his 
acts of possession were consistent with those of someone possessing as if 
he had record title.200 In another arguably sui generis stranger case, McCoy 
v. Toms,201 the court of appeal appears simply to have latched onto 
precarious possession like a deus ex machina to solve a difficult quandary, 
even though the claimant, from an objective standpoint, appeared to have 
no relationship whatsoever with the record owner that would logically lead 
to his classification as a precarious possessor.202 
                                                                                                             
 197. After all, as the Civil Code teaches, “[a] mandate is a contract by which 
a person, the principal, confers authority on another person, the mandatory, to 
transact one or more affairs for the principal.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989 (2016) 
(emphasis added). 
 198. 395 So. 2d 366 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 199. Id. at 371 (noting that on three different occasions the claimant stated that 
“while he was possessing the property in the same manner as he would have if he 
had had record title, he did not consider himself as owner until he was approached 
for an oil, gas and mineral lease some three years ago”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. 384 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
 202. In McCoy, all the parties believed that the two and one half acre tract in 
dispute was owned by the State of Louisiana because it appeared to form part of 
the bed of Lake Bisteneau. Id. at 519. The trial court ruled that the claimant–
possessor lacked the intent to possess as owner and, paradoxically, was in “legal 
bad faith,” permitting the record owner to elect whether to keep the extensive 
improvements that the claimant–possessor had erected on the land and pay him 
for the materials and workmanship or require the possessor to remove the 
improvements. Id. at 519–20. The court of appeal affirmed both of these 
inconsistent rulings, noting only that everyone believed the property in dispute 




Despite these occasionally aberrant decisions, in almost all true 
stranger cases, courts will characterize a claimant–possessor as possessing 
as owner or at least in the manner of an owner. The success of the 
claimant’s possessory action or acquisitive prescription claim thus turns, 
as it should, on other factors. 
B. Contractual and Legal Status Relationships  
The second general category of possession and acquisitive prescription 
cases involves a claimant–possessor and a record owner who have some 
contractual relationship with one another or share some clearly defined legal 
status relationship, for example, as co-owners, family members, or some 
other sui generis legal status.203 Regardless of the particular source of the 
relationship, however, courts generally characterize the claimant as a 
precarious possessor at the outset of the claimed period of corporeal 
possession.204 In these cases, the outcome will usually turn on whether the 
precarious possessor has provided “actual notice to the person on whose 
behalf he is possessing that he intends to possess for himself,” or whether, 
in the special case of co-owners, “he demonstrates by overt and 
unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner that he intends 
to possess the property for himself.”205 
Courts routinely favor record owners in many contractual situations, 
especially in cases involving lessors and lessees, principals and agents, and 
vendors and vendees. However, in cases involving non-contractual 
relationships, the rulings are somewhat less predictable. In the context of 
co-ownership in particular, courts have developed specialized rules and 
presumptions that allow active, in-possession co-owners to terminate 
precarious possession and assert acquisitive prescription against passive, 
out-of-possession co-owners in some situations. In these cases, courts will 
often guard against abuse by co-owners, especially when the passive co-
owner is a vulnerable family member. In family disputes that do not 
involve co-ownership and in other sui generis relationships, precarious 
possession is a status that remains difficult to dislodge. 
                                                                                                             
was owned by the state and that the “important fact is that the defendant and his 
predecessors never intended to claim ownership or possess as owners.” Id. at 522. 
 203. Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier enumerated the many diverse contractual 
and quasi-contractual relationships that can give rise to precarious possession 
beyond those specifically mentioned in article 2236 of the French Civil Code. For 
their lengthy list and discussion see BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 
1, ¶¶ 303–309, at 161–65.  
 204. See generally cases discussed infra notes 20621 and accompanying text. 
 205. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3478 (2016); see also id. art. 3439. 




1. Contractual Relationships 
The clearest examples of contractual relationships giving rise to strong 
presumptions of precariousness arise when the claimant and record owner 
share a nominate contractual relationship, for example, that of lessee and 
lessor, agent and principal, real right holder and owner, or vendee and 
vendor. In almost all of these cases, the claimant must demonstrate by 
clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession has changed character 
and become adverse to the record owner, a burden that the claimant usually 
cannot meet. 
a. Lessees and Lessors 
In most contractual settings, claimant–possessors will be hard-pressed 
to establish they have been possessing non-precariously, that is, in the 
manner an owner would possess and for their own benefit. Article 3438 of 
the Louisiana Civil Code, which instructs that precarious possessors are 
presumed to continue to possess for another although the possessors may 
have privately intended to possess for themselves, specifically lists a lessee 
as a precarious possessor.206 Consequently, when a lessee attempts to 
assert acquisitive prescription or otherwise protect a possessory interest 
vis-à-vis a lessor–record owner, the lessee will usually fail because courts 
are quick to characterize the lessee as a precarious possessor. This 
tendency was true in the 19th century, 207 and it has remained true over the 
last 25 years.208 
                                                                                                             
 206. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3438 (2007). 
 207. Jackson v. Jones, 14 La. Ann. 230 (La. 1859) (stating that purchasers of 
a 50-year lease could not change the nature of their tenure for purposes of 
acquiring ownership by ten-year acquisitive prescription); Calmes v. Duplantier, 
14 La. Ann. 814 (La. 1859) (stating that decedent’s widow could not gain 
ownership of slaves through ten-year acquisitive prescription because “her 
husband held them by the contract of hire, and not by title as proprietor”).  
 208. Linder Oil Co. v. LaBoKay Corp., 556 So. 2d 899, 902 (La. Ct. App. 
1990) (showing that claimant who asserted that his ancestor-in-title acquired 
ownership through farming activities could not establish prescription because 
farming took place with permission of the record owner’s predecessor-in-title 
through an agricultural lease and thus was precarious); see also Comeaux v. 
Davenport, 452 So. 2d 818, 82122 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that invalid lease 
did not render possession precarious when lease was signed by only one of two 
co-owners as lessors, and the court had serious misgivings that the illiterate 
lessee–possessor’s consent was validly given). 




b. Agents and Principals 
A similar pattern emerges when a possessor–claimant begins 
possession as an agent for a principal who happens to be the record owner 
of the immovable property in dispute. In an 1878 decision involving 
changed identities, illegitimate children, and an emancipated former slave, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that mere agents “cannot acquire a legal 
possession, because it cannot be presumed that they had the intention of 
possessing for themselves, and even if they did entertain that dishonest 
intention, their possession continues to be that of the person for whom they 
originally took it.”209 In Cortinas v. Peters,210 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court similarly held that a would-be seller of five lots in New Orleans 
could not establish the validity of his title by establishing that his 
predecessor-in-title had acquired ownership by 30-year acquisitive 
prescription. That claim failed, the Court held, because the predecessor 
had possessed the property only as agent for a bank, which itself had 
acquired title to the property many years earlier.211 In the exceptional case, 
a court may hold that an apparent agent is not a precarious possessor, but 
only if the scope of the agency relationship does not include the property 
in dispute.212 
c. Servitude Holders and Servient Estate Owners, Usufructuaries 
and Naked Owners 
The person entitled to enforce a predial servitude or a usufructuary 
engages in quasi-possession of the servitude or usufruct at issue with either 
the express contractual permission or implied permission of the servient 
estate holder or the naked owner. Accordingly, courts have found that 
these kinds of possessor–claimants cannot acquire ownership of land 
subject to the servitude or usufruct by acquisitive prescription without 
                                                                                                             
 209. Neel v. Hibard, 30 La. Ann. 808, 809 (La. 1878) (stating that the plaintiff 
was unable to claim “legal and peaceable possession” of a lot and improvements 
in the City of New Orleans).  
 210. 68 So. 2d 739 (La. 1953). 
 211. Id. at 741.  
 212. Wm. T. Burton Indus., Inc. v. McDonald, 346 So. 2d 1333, 1335–37 (La. 
Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a man who worked as a timber cruiser–agent for a 
timber company was not a precarious possessor and could acquire land through 
30-year acquisitive prescription because he did not know that the company owned 
the 40 acres in dispute, did not ask or receive permission to use, and never leased 
the land in dispute, and claimant and his father cultivated and completely enclosed 
the land in dispute along with other land they owned for many years). 




providing particularly explicit notice of their intent to possess as owner. In 
a classic 1910 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the holder 
of a servitude of right of way could not acquire ownership of land subject 
to the servitude through ten-year acquisitive prescription by relying solely 
on registry of a title from a third person.213 Quoting extensively from 
French sources, Justice Provosty explained that to notify the actual owner 
of the change of status, a servitude holder or usufructuary must “indicate 
by some outward acts of possession his intention to hold no longer under 
the old title but under the new” and that “these acts must be of an unusually 
pronounced character.”214 In short, this kind of precarious possessor must, 
in Provosty’s words, “so conduct himself as to let the owner know that a 
new order of things has begun.”215 In a 1964 decision, the Louisiana Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeal observed that because a usufructuary is a 
precarious possessor, the usufructuary generally cannot assert acquisitive 
prescription against a naked owner.216 More recent appellate court 
decisions have reached similar conclusions, rejecting claims of acquisitive 
prescription in cases involving both predial servitudes217 and usufructs.218  
d. Vendors and Vendees 
When an owner sells immovable property but the vendee, for some 
reason, does not immediately take corporeal possession of the property 
                                                                                                             
 213. John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan’s La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 53 So. 
22, 34 (La. 1910). 
 214. Id. at 35. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375, 380–81 (La. Ct. App. 1964) 
(citing Leonard Oppenheim, The Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 18 TUL. L. 
REV. 181, 217 (1943)). In Succession of Heckert, the court never reached the 
question of whether the former usufructuary took any action that would have 
constituted notice of an intent to possess as owner. Id. at 381. Indeed, as the 
usufruct at issue only lasted for approximately one year because the usufructuary 
remarried, and the case was litigated approximately 24 years later, it was 
inevitable that the usufructuary’s possession would have been characterized as 
precarious. Id. at 37677. 
 217. Grieshaber Family Props. v. Impatiens, Inc. 63 So. 3d 189, 197 (La. Ct. 
App. 2011) (concluding that the holder of a written servitude of view prohibiting 
construction on a disputed commercial lot in New Orleans was a precarious 
possessor and could not assert acquisitive prescription against the servient-estate 
owner absent acts that would have been sufficient to put the latter on notice of an 
intent to possess as owner). 
 218. Hooper v. Hooper, 941 So. 2d 726, 731 (La. Ct. App. 2006), see 
discussion infra notes 226−28 and accompanying text.  




sold and the vendor remains in possession, courts routinely characterize 
the vendor as a precarious possessor who cannot bring a possessory action 
or assert acquisitive prescription unless the vendee has received clear 
notice that precarious possession has ended. After the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s classic exposition of this rule in Frost Lumber Industries v. 
Harrison,219 Louisiana courts have frequently followed its example220 and 
even extended it to other analogous contexts, including partitions.221  
2. Co-Ownership Disputes: Context Matters 
When two or more persons own a thing in indivision in Louisiana, 
each of the co-owners has a right to use the thing according to its 
                                                                                                             
 219. 41 So. 2d 674, 675–676 (La. 1949). This case involved a partition action, 
and the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the widow of a man who had 
purchased an 80-acre tract of land in 1901 could not intervene and assert 
acquisition of title by acquisitive prescription because her possession was 
precarious in two respects. Id. First, in 1913, the widow sold her undivided one-
half interest in the land to the ancestor-in-title of the lumber company that 
eventually brought the partition action. Id. As a vendor who retains physical 
possession of the property sold, she was presumed to possess precariously for her 
vendee and could not terminate that precariousness until she apprised the vendee 
of her change in status. Id. Second, Harrison also possessed a one-half undivided 
interest in the tract as usufructurary. Id. As a result, although she was entitled to 
remain in possession of the entire tract until she was divested by the partition 
initiated by her vendee, the “quality” of her physical possession was converted 
from its duality of owner and usufructuary to that of “merely usufructuary.” Id. 
 220. Maddox v. Vanlangendonck, 334 So. 2d 739, 743 (La. Ct. App. 1976) 
(holding that a person possessing under a bond for deed contract is a precarious 
possessor); James Harvey Ramsey Estate, Inc. v. Pace, 467 So. 2d 1202, 1208 
(La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the heirs of a vendor who held possession of a 
five acre tract of land could not assert a possessory action against the vendee’s 
son and heir because the vendor’s heirs were bound by the warranty obligation in 
the original warranty deed and subsequent correction deed and noting that “[h]eirs 
of a vendor-warrantor of peaceful possession to a vendee, accepting the 
succession, are not in a situation of third-party usurpers or bad faith possessors 
adverse to their ancestor’s vendee”).  
 221. Feazel v. Howard, 511 So. 2d 1306, 1308 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (applying 
the principle of Frost Lumber to a dispute among co-heirs who acquired 
neighboring tracts of land by virtue of a partition and analogizing possession 
exercised by one co-heir over land of another co-heir to that of a vendor retaining 
possession for the vendee, ultimately concluding that “retention of possession by 
a former co-owner makes him the presumed precarious possessor for the other 
former co-owner who by virtue of the partition has become owner in full of a 
specified parcel”). 




destination and cannot prevent the other co-owners from making use of it, 
unless a use and management agreement otherwise restricts the use of the 
thing by the co-owners.222 Because of this fundamental rule of co-
ownership, co-owners in possession are presumed to be possessing for 
themselves with respect to their own undivided interest and on behalf of the 
other co-owners, and, therefore, their possession is deemed to be precarious 
with respect to fellow co-owners.223 
Building on this foundational principle, articles 3439 and 3478 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code provide specialized rules for termination of precarious 
possession by co-owners. In the context of possession alone, article 3439 
instructs that “[a] co-owner, or his universal successor, commences to 
possess for himself when he demonstrates this intent by overt and 
unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner.”224 In the 
specific context of acquisitive prescription, article 3478 reiterates that a co-
owner “may commence to prescribe” by meeting the same notice standard 
of “overt and unambiguous acts,” but this article adds by way of illustrative 
example that “[t]he acquisition and recordation of a title from a person other 
than a co-owner may mark the commencement of prescription.”225 
Given the frequency with which co-ownership arises in Louisiana as the 
result of inter-family donations, succession, divorce and the termination of 
community property regimes, as well as through intentional acquisitions by 
two unrelated persons, that a rich body of case law has developed involving 
precarious possession and co-ownership is no surprise. Although courts 
might be expected to favor precarious possession defenses asserted by out-
of-possession co-owners overwhelmingly, the case law has in fact yielded 
mixed results. 
                                                                                                             
 222. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 801–802 (2016). 
 223. Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1221; Hendrick v. Lee, 471 So. 2d 904, 
908 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 224. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439. 
 225. Id. art. 3478. Hargrave explains that this additional language in article 
3478 was intended to codify the rule in Dupuis v. Broadhurst. 213 So. 2d 528, 
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was doubtful that the indexing system for property records would allow a co-
owner out of possession to detect recordation of a title from another person. 
Ruminations, supra note 66, at 1222. 




a. Co-Owners Who Remain Precarious Possessors 
In many cases, courts do hold, as might be expected, that co-owners 
in possession of immovable property possess precariously for their fellow 
co-owners and cannot prove they gave sufficient notice of their intent to 
possess on their own behalf. Sometimes, as in Hooper v. Hooper,226 a case 
in which the appellate court rejected an assertion of 30-year acquisitive 
prescription by one brother against the estate of his mentally incompetent 
brother regarding a one-sixteenth ownership interest in family property, 
the result can be easily explained. In Hooper, not only did the appellate 
court note blatant defects in the purported title from another person upon 
which the claimant relied to found his claim of voluntary transfer of 
ownership,227 it expressed a strong conviction that the claimant could not 
possibly have given adequate notice of his intent to possess as owner to 
the out-of-possession co-owner because of the latter’s vulnerability.228  
In another recent decision,229 the same appellate court, citing Hooper, 
rejected an acquisitive prescription claim in a boundary dispute because 
one of the claimant’s four siblings failed to execute a partition deed 
resulting from his parents’ succession and because neither that sibling’s 
estate nor any of his descendants were given adequate notice of the 
partition.230 In particular, the court found that the claimant could not tack 
his possession to that of his parents to satisfy the prescriptive time period 
because of the precarious nature of his possession vis-à-vis one deceased 
sibling and the absence of any overt and unambiguous act that could give 
notice to his deceased sibling’s estate or descendants.231 
More recently, in Cockerham v. Cockerham,232 a court similarly 
determined that 30-year acquisitive prescription did not start to run 
because an invalid 1963 deed from a third person to the claimant’s father 
                                                                                                             
 226. 941 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 227. The court found that the deed, which the brothers’ mother signed and 
purportedly transferred the one-sixteenth ownership interest to the claimant while 
allowing the incompetent brother to retain a usufruct, failed to transfer ownership. Id. 
at 730. 
 228. In light of his brother’s mental incompetence, the court concluded that the 
claimant could only satisfy the “overt and unambiguous acts” requirement by giving 
actual notice to his brother’s legal representative, a feat not possible until many 
years later when a representative was finally appointed and qualified. Id. at 731.  
 229. Graham v. Bernheimer, 6 So. 3d 343 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 230. Id. at 344–46. 
 231. Id. at 347.  
 232. 16 So. 3d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 




did not constitute notice to the claimant’s co-owners.233 Not only was the 
deed authored by a person who did not have any actual or future interest 
in the property to convey, but no other acts of possession followed that 
could have given the other co-owners notice of the claimant’s intent to 
possess the property in dispute as the sole owner.234 Finally, in Andras v. 
Thibodeaux,235 another partition case involving multiple co-owners who 
inherited property from a common ancestor, the appellate court held that 
multiple acts of possession of the intervenor claimants—including 
fencing, building houses and other structures, raising animals, cutting and 
planting trees—still failed to place the other co-owners on notice of an 
intent to possess as exclusive owners, particularly in the absence of any 
title or document translative of ownership.236 In all of these cases, courts 
treated the general presumption that a precarious possessor continues to 
possess for or on behalf of his fellow co-owners in a robust fashion. 
b. Co-Owners Who Terminate Precarious Possession 
Despite these decisions hostile to acquisitive prescription claims 
asserted by co-owners, sometimes a co-owner can establish 30-year 
acquisitive prescription vis-à-vis another co-owner. The common 
denominator in this alternative line of decisions is the combination of a 
recorded instrument, whether executed by a third party or another co-
owner, that is either translative or declarative of ownership, and substantial 
acts of possession that are capable of providing reasonable notice that 
possessing co-owners intend to possess for their own interest. In addition, 
strong equitable factors, such as the length of time of the claimant’s sole 
possession, investment in the property by the claimant, and extreme 
neglect on the part of the out-of-possession co-owner all weigh in the 
claimant’s favor. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Succession of Seals237 is the 
foundational modern decision establishing this line of authority. In that 
case, the succession of Stokes Seals sued to be placed in possession of a 
                                                                                                             
 233. Id. at 1269–70. 
 234. Id. at 1270. In Cockerham, the other co-owners also acted as if the 
property belonged to all of them. Id. at 1271. 
 235. 157 So. 3d 767 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 236. Id. at 768–71. See also Headrick v. Lee, 471 So. 2d 904, 907–09 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 1985) (holding that brother and his heirs who farmed property for 75 years, 
paid all the property taxes, and did not share proceeds with other co-owners did not 
terminate precarious possession because acts of occupancy and use, “without 
more,” are insufficient to constitute notice of adverse possession to co-owners). 
 237. Succession of Seals, 150 So. 2d 13 (La. 1963). 




60-acre tract of land based on 10- and 30-year acquisitive prescription.238 
The defendants, Stokes’s collateral relatives, denied that he owned the 
land exclusively and claimed that they, too, had possessed the land because 
they inherited undivided interests from Stokes’s uncle, Henry Seals.239 
Stokes apparently had some reason to think he owned the land exclusively 
because Henry Seals’s widow had purportedly transferred ownership of 
the land to Stokes in 1913.240 That transfer was found to be invalid, 
however, because the land was actually separate property that Henry had 
acquired before his marriage and, thus, Henry’s widow could not convey 
it to Stokes.241 Consequently, after Henry’s death, when the land was 
placed in Henry’s succession, Stokes became one of several co-heirs who 
acquired undivided interests in the land.242 
Soon after the apparent but invalid transfer of ownership in 1913, 
Stokes began to engage with the land. First, he paid off two mortgages 
burdening the property.243 Then, treating the property as his home, he built 
houses, fenced the land, and made other improvements.244 He also farmed 
the land, sold timber, granted mineral leases, paid property taxes, and sold 
portions of the property.245 In contrast, the defendants displayed little, if 
any, interest in the disputed land except when they occasionally needed a 
place to live and “did some improving for their own comfort.”246 Further, 
while Stokes took care of the defendants’ mother, charged some of his co-
heirs rent, allowed others to live on the land for short times rent-free, and 
granted other “favors,” his actions, the Court observed, were “purely 
beneficial” as he “manifested no intention of abandoning his adverse 
possession.”247 In short, the Court actually viewed the defendants’ acts of 
possession as precarious vis-à-vis Stokes, not the other way around.248 
Commenting on the defendants’ long-standing indifference to the land 
until they learned of its potential mineral exploitation value, the Court 
observed, 
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The genius of our law does not favor the claims of those who have 
long slept on their rights and who, after years of inertia, conveying 
an assurance of acquiescence in a given state of things, suddenly 
wake up at the welcome vision of an unexpected advantage and 
invoke the aid of the courts for relief, under the effect of a newly 
discovered technical error in some ancient transaction or 
settlement.249 
In the end, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Seals held that Stokes 
acquired ownership of the disputed land by 30-year acquisitive prescription, 
affirming the trial court’s findings that his possession “was that of owner 
and was hostile to that of defendants for a period of thirty years.”250  
Seals proved to be influential because it established the principle that 
co-owners or co-heirs could terminate precarious possession and begin to 
prescribe in their own right if they could show some written, recorded 
instrument that appeared to convey or declare title or ownership, even if that 
instrument was invalid, as long as additional acts of possession occurred 
after the recording of the instrument.251 Following Seals, a number of 
reported decisions applied its basic teaching and held that co-owners 
acquired ownership by 30-year acquisitive prescription on the basis of a 
variety of recorded instruments and additional acts of possession. The 
recorded instruments that have been found to suffice include a simulated 
sale,252 acts of partition,253 and even a prohibited donation omnium 
                                                                                                             
 249. Id. at 21 (quoting Lafitte, Dufilho & Co. v. Godchaux, 35 La. Ann. 1161, 
1163–64 (1883)). 
 250. Id. at 21–22. 
 251. Id. at 17−21. Justice McCaleb’s concurring opinion in Seals cemented 
this understanding as he emphasized that Stokes Seals’ acquisitive prescription 
claim was well founded precisely because he “went into possession of the 
property not as a co-heir or co-owner but as a sole owner thereof under a title 
translative of the property notwithstanding that the title under which he acquired 
was not a good prescriptive title.” Id. at 22. 
 252. Detraz v. Pere, 183 So. 2d 401, 402–03 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that 
a 1926 deed later claimed to have been a simulation combined with acts of 
cultivation and enclosure was sufficient to start 30-year acquisitive prescription). 
 253. Dupuis v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 525, 531–32, 531 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 
1968) (on rehearing) (holding that the claimant’s ancestor-in-title began to 
prescribe in his own interest by virtue of two instruments, a partition deed and a 
cash deed, each purporting to convey a one-half interest in title, along with acts 
of farming and fencing); see also Minton v. Whitworth, 393 So. 2d 294, 297 (La. 
Ct. App. 1980) (holding that an act of partition executed by all the co-owners 
constituted notice to co-owners that subsequent possession was adverse and 
hostile to the common interest). 




bonorum.254 A 1983 decision, in which the recorded instruments included 
several 19th-century succession sales and a 1904 act of partition, also pointed 
out that no requirement exists that the co-owners who opposed the claim of 
acquisitive prescription have actually participated in the transactions leading 
to the recordation of title.255 The only kind of recorded instruments that do not 
reliably serve this purpose are tax sale adjudications and redemptions.256 
Finally, in Franks Petroleum Inc. v. Babineaux,257 a well-known decision 
from 1984, the court resolved a dispute between two sets of co-owners who 
were descendants of two brothers over the right to receive mineral and royalty 
interests by determining that one group had acquired “full title” to the 
underlying properties by acquisitive prescription.258 The controversy arose 
because in the late 1800s or early 1900s, when one brother sold his interest in 
the property to the other, the deed was lost or destroyed and not recorded.259 
In the late 1930s, the widow and descendants of the vendor executed a series 
of quitclaim deeds reciting these facts and transferring whatever interest 
they had in the property to the vendee’s descendants.260 The vendee and 
his heirs also exercised possession of the land in dispute from as early as 
1900 by living on the property, farming it, growing timber and making 
timber sales, selling sand and gravel, and surveying and marking 
boundaries.261 In contrast, the vendor’s heirs did not exercise any physical 
possession.262 The recorded instrument that started the clock running for 
                                                                                                             
 254. Givens v. Givens, 273 So. 2d 863, 868 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that 
recordation of a prohibited donation omnium bonorum along with 40 years of 
substantial open and public possession was sufficient to commence acquisitive 
prescription). 
 255. Towles v. Heirs of Morrison, 428 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1983) 
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acquisitive prescription, according to the court, was a 1937 ex parte 
judgment of possession in the succession of the vendee brother and his 
wife that listed their heirs as the owners of the property in dispute.263 
In ruling for the possessor–claimants, the court of appeal noted that 
recently enacted articles 3439 and 3478 of the Civil Code did not change 
the law and cited many of the decisions referenced above for the general 
proposition that possession by one co-owner is generally considered as 
being exercised on behalf of all co-owners, except, 
[W]here a co-owner possesses under a recorded instrument 
apparently conveying title (even though the purported conveyance 
is invalid), the recorded instrument, together with the acts of 
possession, constitutes notice to other co-owners and the possession 
is then regarded as hostile to the interests of the other co-owners, 
rebutting the presumption that possession is for the benefit of all co-
owners.264 
The court also noted that the language in article 3478 referring to the 
“acquisition and recordation of a title from a person other than a co-owner” 
merely illustrates the kind of act that can suffice to start acquisitive 
prescription running and is not exclusive.265 Thus, the ex parte judgment 
of possession sending the vendee heirs into possession of the “whole 
interest” in the subject property was “an act of notice to the other record 
co-owners of the intended adverse possession of [the vendee’s] heirs.”266 
Yet it was most likely the totality of the evidence—the many acts of 
possession, the quitclaim deeds attesting to the prevailing heirs’ apparently 
honest belief that they were possessing the property as owners, and the 
judgment of possession—that accounts for the court’s conclusion that the 
vendee brother’s heirs deserved title by acquisitive prescription. 
Considered together, these co-ownership decisions illustrate how 
Louisiana courts already engage in highly relationship-specific evaluations 
of parties’ experiences and expectations regarding property subject to 
acquisitive prescription claims. Although the fairness of giving any weight 
to recorded instruments of which a passive co-owner may be unaware is 
debatable,267 clearly the courts look at these instruments and the subsequent 
acts of possession in the context of the particular family or personal 
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relationships that have formed and carefully evaluate the demands and 
expectations those relationships might reasonably have generated.  
3. Other Family Matters: Sticky Precarious Possession 
Some precarious possession cases involve disputes among relatives 
and family members who are not co-owners. In several reported decisions 
in this sub-category, courts characterized claimants as precarious 
possessors who could not establish possessory rights or acquisitive 
prescription because either the possessor’s status as a permissive possessor 
was apparent from the outset based on the nature of the family relationship 
or the claimants did not clearly communicate an intent to possess as owner. 
In Falgoust v. Innes,268 for example, the court held that a man who had 
been given permission by his mother-in-law to erect a building and operate 
a garage and filling station on her land was a precarious possessor.269 As a 
result, when he was eventually evicted from the land upon the dissolution 
of the man’s marriage to the landowner’s daughter, the court held that he 
was not entitled to any restitution for the improvements as a good-faith 
possessor because he was “not a possessor at all.”270 In a sense, the 
claimant in Falgoust was characterized as a mere licensee—and thus as a 
precarious possessor—based on the familial relationship he temporarily 
enjoyed with his mother-in-law. 
In Hammond v. Averett,271 a possessory action, the court found that the 
claimants of a 20-acre fenced tract of land that had belonged to their uncle 
were also mere precarious possessors.272 Even though they had cared for 
their uncle for many years, notified the uncle’s children, who were 
presumably their cousins, when their uncle’s health failed, gardened and 
raised cattle on the tract after the uncle’s death, and even paid the ad 
valorem property taxes after losing contact with the uncle’s children, the 
court held that the claimants were “mere users” of the land because they 
had not done enough to put the record owners on notice of their intent to 
become owners.273 Paradoxically, the claimants’ strong sense of familial 
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responsibility to their uncle did not advance and may have even 
undermined their claim of acquisitive prescription. 
In the two most difficult cases in this sub-category involving relatives 
who lived nearby to one another, the courts focused more on the 
neighborliness of the parties rather than their family status in ruling against 
the claimants. In the first, Succession of Kemp v. Robertson,274 the court 
held that a claimant known as “Aunt Mae” did not acquire ownership of a 
300-acre tract of land through acquisitive prescription because 
witnesses—business associates, employees, and relatives of the record 
owner—testified that the claimant acknowledged the record owner’s 
ownership and once asked the record owner for assistance in building a 
boat ramp and cutting some trees on the disputed property.275 In reaching 
this decision, the court discounted a long history of corporeal possession 
and public assertions of a claim to the land stretching as far back as the 
1920s when the claimant and her family returned to the place of her 1882 
birth and began living and taking care of the property in dispute.276 In 
Succession of Kemp, the evidence of an apparent acknowledgment might 
have simply overwhelmed the other strong evidence of the claimant’s 
intent to possess as owner. 
Finally, in Armstrong v. Armstrong,277 another possessory action, 
plaintiffs claimed to have possessed 19 acres of bottomland adversely to 
record owners who happened to be their co-heirs.278 In essence, the 
plaintiffs, one group of heirs of a common ancestor, Stephen Armstrong, 
asserted legal possession of the land against another group of heirs, 
Douglas Armstrong and his heirs, who had acquired undisputed title to 47 
acres of Stephen Armstrong’s original 140-acre tract of land.279 No fences 
or other obstacles separated defendants’ bottomland from the balance of 
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the estate, which the plaintiffs owned along with Douglas as co-heir.280 
Although the plaintiffs had corporeally possessed the 19 acres in dispute, 
the court found that the defendants never abandoned or renounced their 
interests in the land, and moreover, that the plaintiffs’ acts of detention 
never excluded the defendants from their possession.281 In fact, the court 
held that the defendants, who continued to pay taxes on property, were 
entitled to a presumption that they continued to retain their intent to 
possess as owners.282 Ultimately, the court in Armstrong found that the 
plaintiffs could not show any acts that would “bring home” to the 
defendants the fact that they intended to take the land in dispute for 
themselves.283 The strong familial and neighborly relationship between the 
parties, who were technically co-owners of land adjacent to the land in 
dispute, was thus decisive.284 Just before quoting extensively from 
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, the court indeed characterized plaintiffs’ 
possession as precarious because it took place “with Defendants’ 
permission or tolerance.”285 In this sense, Armstrong might even be 
characterized as a dispute between neighbors rather than family members 
and thus could fall into the third category of paradigmatic precarious 
possession cases.286 
4. Sui Generis Legal Status Relationships 
Occasionally, the parties in a title dispute over land have some special 
legal status relationship that does not fall into any of the other categories 
described above. Sometimes, as in Thomas v. Congregation of St. Saveur 
Roman Catholic Church,287 the relationship is between an institution and 
natural persons who serve that institution. In Thomas, the father of the 
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claimant–possessors had for many years served as sexton of a church, the 
record owner of the property in dispute.288 The court held that his 
numerous acts of possession were tolerated at the sufferance of the church 
in return for his service as sexton and thus he did not possess “as owner.”289 
In Memorial Hall Museum, Inc. v. University of New Orleans 
Foundation,290 the unusual relationship was between two different non-
profit institutions. In Memorial Hall, a non-profit corporation that 
operated a museum housing Confederate artifacts claimed ownership of a 
building that had originally been constructed as an “annex” to a building 
owned by a non-profit library association.291 The court ruled in favor of 
the successor to the non-profit library association, the University of New 
Orleans, holding that the lengthy possession and occupation of the “annex” 
by the plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest was precarious because in a 
1931 speech the president of the library association stated that he was only 
putting the plaintiff’s predecessor into “possession” of the annex “for the 
‘use’ of [that organization].”292 Numerous other statements and acts 
confirmed that the plaintiff’s predecessor recognized the library 
association as owner, and the plaintiff’s predecessor failed to notify the 
library association when it did assert ownership of the building.293 
Finally, precarious possession can even become an issue when the 
object of a dispute is a movable whose possession has been exchanged 
under a voluntary arrangement between parties exploring a business 
transaction. In SongByrd, Inc. v. Bearsville Records, Inc.,294 Albert 
Grossman, a famous New York music impresario had been given 
possession of several master tapes made by a well-known New Orleans 
musician—Henry Roeland Byrd, also known as “Professor Longhair”—
for demonstration purposes only.295 The United States Court of Appeal for 
the Fifth Circuit thus held that Grossman’s estate could not assert 
liberative prescription to defend against the revindicatory action brought 
by the musician’s successor-in-interest and could not assert acquisitive 
prescription unless it could show that Grossman or his estate had 
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terminated precarious possession by giving Byrd, his heirs, or his 
successor-in-interest actual notice of an intent to keep the tapes as 
owner.296 Just like Falgoust v. Inness,297 SongByrd was essentially a case 
involving a claimant–possessor whose possession was characterized as 
precarious because it began through an implied and informal license. 
In these special legal status cases, courts instinctively use a relational 
approach to determine whether the claimant was possessing precariously. 
Because the parties began dealing with the property at issue in a particular 
familial, institutional, or quasi-contractual relationship that involved some 
kind of sharing or mutual accommodation, courts analyze both parties’ 
expectations in the context of that relationship and seem to demand strong 
proof that the cooperative or quasi-contractual nature of the relationship 
with respect to the property at issue has ended and that the claimant has 
communicated a new kind of interest in the property.298 As the final 
category of possession and acquisitive prescription cases discussed in Part 
II.C shows, courts would be wise to follow this relational approach even 
more self-consciously. 
C. Neighbors and Members of Close-Knit Communities 
Neighbors and members of a close-knit community can be wonderful 
friends. They can lend support to each other in times of trouble. They can 
provide each other with camaraderie and entertainment. They can work 
together as partners in community projects. However, neighbors and 
community members can also become embroiled in bitter conflict. In 
particular, when one neighbor uses another neighbor’s property and that 
use is tolerated or ignored for a long time, the first neighbor may believe 
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that she has acquired a property right while the other may believe that 
nothing has changed. Indeed, that is exactly the kind of dispute that 
surfaced in Boudreaux v. Cummings.299 In these inherently difficult cases, 
courts will be tempted to draw on murky concepts emerging from older 
French sources, such as acts of “pure convenience” and “mere tolerance,” 
regardless of their codal pedigree.300 Further, as the conflicting opinions 
in Boudreaux amply demonstrate, resolution of these cases may create 
even more uncertainty for Louisiana property law. 
As a general matter, courts in this kind of case frequently classify a 
possessor–claimant as a precarious possessor, despite a long history of 
corporeal possession.301 Occasionally, though, neighbor claimants prove 
that they always possessed in their own right or at least began to possess 
in their own right at some moment in time and thus succeed in acquiring 
ownership or predial servitudes in immovable property by acquisitive 
prescription.302 Although the number of recent cases that fall into the 
neighbor and close-knit community category is not large, several distinct 
jurisprudential patterns emerge. 
1. Neighbors as Precarious Possessors Through Acknowledgment or 
Agreement 
In one line of decisions involving acquisitive prescription claims and 
possessory actions asserted by one neighbor against another, courts have 
classified claimants as precarious possessors based on evidence of some 
acknowledgement or agreement that the claimant’s possession was permissive 
at the outset.303 In these cases, although the parties may be neighbors with one 
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another, the presence of an acknowledgement or agreement between the 
parties suggests these cases may be more properly classified as contractual 
disputes in which courts commonly use the presumption of article 3438 to 
find that claimants are precarious possessors.304 Moreover, the evidence of 
acknowledgement in these cases could support a finding that even though 
prescription might have begun to run, the claimants’ recognition of the 
other party’s ownership rights nevertheless “interrupted” it.305 
2. Neighbors as Precarious Possessors Through Inference 
More tellingly, in another series of neighbor decisions, courts 
classified possessor–claimants as precarious possessors based, not on an 
informal acknowledgement or agreement, but rather on a cluster of more 
ambiguous facts and judicial intuitions, including community testimony 
indicating the likelihood of permissive use;306 a landowner’s practice of 
allowing general community access to the land in dispute;307 inferences by 
the court about the likely intentions of the parties;308 and doubts that the 
claimant’s acts of possession gave sufficient notice of a claim to the record 
owner.309 On occasion, courts have even invented alternative presumptions 
to reach a desired outcome.310 
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In Humble v. Dewey,311 the claimant was a small-town grocery store 
owner who had begun raising crops and pasturing animals to feed his 
family on a six-acre tract of land across the road from the two-acre tract of 
land that he owned and had inhabited since 1932.312 Although the claimant 
stated that he never asked anyone for permission to use the disputed land 
and claimed not to know initially who owned it, one of the record owners 
told the claimant he could have the land in compensation for debts he owed 
the claimant at his grocery store.313 The conflict between the claimant and 
the record owners did not surface until 1962, when the record owners 
authorized a prospective purchaser to inspect the disputed land and the 
claimant denied entry.314 Although the claimant and record owners did not 
own adjacent properties, only a public road separated their properties.315 
More important was that the parties were quite familiar with each other 
through family and community relationships.316 
In holding that the claimant was, in fact, a precarious possessor and 
thus did not acquire ownership through acquisitive prescription, the court 
in Humble acknowledged the claimant’s reliance on the general rule that a 
possessor is presumed to possess as owner under article 3488 of the 1870 
Civil Code.317 Yet the court appears to turn that traditional presumption on 
its head by declaring:  
[O]rdinarily the intent to possess as owner should not be inferred 
unless the actions of the possessor or the surrounding facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to reasonably apprise the public, and 
the record title owner of the property, of the fact that the possessor 
has the positive intent to possess as owner.318 
With this curious framework in place, the court of appeal found that 
the claimant’s acts of cultivating and raising animals on the land were 
insufficient to establish an intent to possess as owner.319 Indeed, the court 
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declared its confidence that the claimant had no intention of remaining on 
the land indefinitely and had “occupied the land, therefore, merely by the 
suffrage of the owner.”320 
Perhaps aware that it was breaking new ground, the court in Humble 
also justified its holding, much like the majority opinion in Boudreaux, by 
noting the general burden of proof placed on a party claiming acquisitive 
prescription and emphasizing that the claimant’s “own testimony, 
considered with the surrounding facts and circumstances,” rebutted and 
overcame the core presumption that a possessor is presumed to possess as 
“master and owner.”321 Make no mistake: the court’s reasoning in Humble 
is unclear and contradictory, thus justifying Professor Hargrave’s curt 
criticism.322 Yet one way to explain the court’s conclusion is that perhaps 
the court of appeal sensed that the claimant’s acts of possession did not 
challenge the record owners’ claims radically enough, particularly given 
that the parties were so familiar with each other and the community itself 
seemed to believe that the claimant was possessing with the permission of 
the record owners.323 
As the rise in oil and gas prices led to increased mineral exploitation 
and competition for land in South Louisiana, eight years after Humble, the 
court in Verret v. Norwood324 relied primarily on testimony regarding 
community custom about neighborly sharing to reject the plaintiffs’ claim 
of 30-year acquisitive prescription in an action to remove a cloud on 
title.325 The initial problem for the plaintiffs, the possessor–claimants, in 
Verret was that their ancestor-in-title, the original record owner of the 160 
acres of Atchafalaya Basin marshland in dispute who had received a patent 
from the State in 1888, had lost title to the defendants’ ancestors-in-title 
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as the result of a 1906 tax sale.326 The primary act of possession that the 
plaintiffs relied on to substantiate their claim of acquisitive prescription 
was a 1913 timber harvest of the merchantable cypress on the land 
authorized by their ancestor-in-title.327 The defendants’ ancestors-in-title 
had also demonstrated little interest in the land, having failed to pay property 
taxes in 1909, which in turn caused the land to be adjudicated to the state 
until the defendants redeemed the land in 1965 after finally paying all the 
taxes in arrears.328 
Ultimately, the court in Verret rejected the plaintiffs’ acquisitive 
prescription claim for two reasons. First, their ancestor’s initial act of 
corporeal possession, although significant in 1913, was never repeated or 
followed by any other significant acts of possession.329 Second, ample 
testimony by both the plaintiffs’ witnesses and other members of the local 
community who inhabited, hunted, and trapped in the Atchafalaya Basin, 
established that the land there was generally regarded as a kind of commons 
where boundaries and ownership rights were generally ignored.330 As the 
court noted, 
It was established that in the Basin it was not uncommon for 
timber to be removed without the owner’s permission. Hunting, 
fishing, trapping, and other such acts were not established to have 
been made as owner. Instead those acts were consistent with the 
community’s understanding that all property in the Basin was 
available for use without regard to ownership.331 
In other words, because the entire community acted as if “ownership 
was irrelevant,”332 and because the plaintiffs’ acts were consistent with this 
community norm of access, the court concluded that the plaintiffs and their 
ancestor-in-title never truly had the requisite intent to possess as owner 
and thus were precarious possessors, even though the record owner had 
largely ignored the property for more than 50 years.333  
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In a difficult neighbor case like Verret, in which neither the claimant 
nor the record owner has demonstrated much commitment to the land and 
the land itself has generally been available for use by anyone in the 
community, precarious possession can thus serve as a convenient tool for 
courts to solve an otherwise insoluble dilemma. In another unusual 
neighbor case, 25 years later, the court similarly held that even in the 
absence of an informal agreement between neighbors, when a landowner 
allows a broad segment of the local community to use its land for 
designated purposes, a claimant who also uses the land for the same 
general purposes can likewise be characterized as a precarious 
possessor.334 
Finally, in Delacroix Corp. v. Perez,335 an unusually interesting neighbor 
case, the court ruled that Chalin Perez, the President of Plaquemines Parish,336 
and a corporation he owned—Stella Lands, Inc.—could not acquire 
ownership of 294 acres of disputed land in that parish because he and his 
corporation were precarious possessors. The controversy originated in a 
purported misunderstanding by Perez regarding the eastern boundary of a 
riparian tract he owned fronting on the east bank of the Mississippi River.337 
Perez reportedly believed that his title, which on its face extended to the 
“Forty Arpent Line,” extended all the way to the “Forty Arpent Canal.”338 In 
other words, he thought the Forty Arpent Line and the Forty Arpent Canal 
were coterminous. In fact, they were not coterminous, and Delacroix 
Corporation, an entity that had acquired and maintained control of almost 
110,000 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, owned the intervening land 
in dispute.339 Perez began using the land in dispute for cattle grazing and 
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crawfishing at some point after he acquired his riparian tract in the early 
1950s.340 
Delacroix did not file suit to stop Perez from using and occupying the 
disputed lands until 1993.341 In 1994, Perez and Stella Lands filed their 
own possessory action.342 After the actions were consolidated and the trial 
court ruled that Perez and Stella Lands acquired ownership of the disputed 
land by 30-year acquisitive prescription,343 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with Delacroix’s argument that Perez’s 
possession of the disputed land was precarious.344 For the court, a June 
1993 letter written by Perez, himself a lawyer, just six months before the 
litigation began, provided the most important evidence of the precarious 
nature of Perez’s possession.345 In that letter, Perez first acknowledged that 
a portion of a crayfish pond he had constructed was located on Delacroix’s 
property, but denied that Delacroix owned the remainder of the land on 
which the pond was built.346 Second, he offered to enter into a “long term 
lease with a minimal rental to satisfy your concern of adverse possession,” 
despite professing insufficient information to determine the exact 
boundary line between his and the Delacroix property.347 Finally, his letter 
stated: “except that subject to the above paragraph, it was not my intention 
to adversely possess land owned by the Delacroix Corporation.”348 
One might reasonably interpret this letter as an amicable attempt to 
settle a difficult boundary dispute. The court, however, treated it as 
practically conclusive evidence of a formal acknowledgement that Perez 
“did not intend to claim ownership of property to which Delacroix held 
the title.”349 Yet the court also bootstrapped its finding of precarious 
possession by referring to other evidence and testimony that tended to 
show that Delacroix was intimidated by Perez’s power in the parish and 
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therefore, its acquiescence to Perez’s use of the land in dispute was 
understandable.350 
Although it acknowledged that Perez did appear to have “unbridled 
use of the subject property”351 and thus in many ways acted as the agenda-
setter for the property, the court found that Perez never truly interfered 
with Delacroix’s ability to exercise its rights and fulfill its obligations of 
ownership, including granting mineral leases, granting seismic rights of 
way, permitting two oil wells to be drilled on the property—though both 
wells proved to be dry—and paying the property taxes throughout the 
period at issue.352 In the end, the court found that “by failing to overtly 
challenge Delacroix’s use of the subject property, Perez in effect lulled 
Delacroix into a false sense of security that Perez was operating within the 
terms of the oral agreement between the parties.”353 Although this ultimate 
conclusion is certainly defensible, unfortunately the decision, as in the 
other difficult neighbor cases discussed above, did not provide any kind of 
structured framework to analyze future precarious possession disputes. 
3. Neighbors Who Possess as Owners 
Although most cases involving neighbors or members of the same 
close-knit community result in findings that possessor–claimants are 
precarious possessors, at least four reported decisions in this category have 
culminated with determinations that possessor–claimants were possessing 
with the intent to own. In Blanda v. Rivers,354 the plaintiff and defendants 
owned adjoining properties on Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans.355 The 
plaintiff, Blanda, sued to force the defendants, the Rivers, to remove water, 
gas, and sewer pipes and gas flues in the party wall separating their two 
properties that extended onto Blanda’s side of the party wall and beyond 
into the air space over his property.356 The Rivers claimed that they had 
acquired a continuous and apparent servitude as a result of the continuous 
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presence of these installations through ten-year acquisitive prescription 
under article 765 of the 1870 Civil Code.357  
The Rivers made the installations in 1951, 17 years before the 
litigation ensued.358 Blanda’s predecessor-in-title, Landry, apparently 
gave the Rivers permission to install the pipes on his side of the party wall 
when the Rivers renovated their building to create apartments.359 Landry 
and the Rivers did not execute any writing to document their agreement, 
nor did they reach any understanding relating to the establishment of a 
predial servitude.360 Indeed, as the court noted, “[t]here was no discussion 
of their legal rights and, at least as far as Mr. Landry was concerned, there 
was no evidence that he had any other intent except to be a good neighbor 
and not to interfere with, nor object to, the Rivers’ installation of the 
plumbing facilities.”361 At the time of the installation, Landry was unaware 
of his ownership interest in the party wall.362 In fact, although he knew the 
pipes “protruded over his property and that he gave his permission,” 
Landry learned that he owned half of the wall only when he was 
negotiating the sale of his property to Blanda in 1965, shortly before 
Blanda filed the lawsuit. 363  
Affirming the trial court, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
held that the Rivers had, in fact, acquired a servitude by acquisitive 
prescription.364 In this context, the court initially rejected Blanda’s 
contention that the Rivers were precarious possessors merely because of 
Landry’s acquiescence in the installation of the encroaching pipes and his 
subsequent assistance in repairing them in rather obscure terms.365 
However, when it addressed the essential element of adverse possession 
in acquisitive prescription generally,366 the court observed more sharply 
that “the enjoyment of the right in favor of Rivers’ estate was no less 
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adverse merely because Landry did not object.”367 This observation is 
crucial because the court can be understood to mean that implied permission 
should not be read into a record owner’s acquiescence or passivity without 
some more tangible evidence that the possessor began possession with the 
intent to possess for or with the permission of the owner. 
Indeed, the court in Blanda seemed to believe that the plaintiff’s 
predecessor, Landry, bore the burden of stopping prescription from 
accruing. “At any time before the expiration of ten years,” it noted, “Landry 
could have protested and stopped the running of prescription, just as was 
done by the plaintiff Blanda with regard to the rear most flue installed in 
1965.”368 In sum, Blanda represents a robust application of the Civil Code 
principle that a possessor is presumed to intend to possess as owner in the 
context of a neighbor dispute concerning acquisitive prescription of a 
predial servitude in contrast to the relatively weak application employed by 
the Louisiana Supreme Court majority in Boudreaux v. Cummings.369  
In Merchant v. Acadia-Vermillion Irrigation Co. Inc.,370 the plaintiffs 
owned a tract of land in Vermillion Parish bordered on two sides by 
property owned by the defendants—two corporations, one of which was a 
canal company.371 Until 1981, the defendants’ property had been used as 
part of a canal system for irrigation of crops, but in that year the canals 
were filled in, and plans were made to subdivide the property in 
anticipation of residential development.372 The plaintiffs asserted that they 
had acquired ownership of the disputed land formerly covered by the 
canals by 30-year acquisitive prescription based on the fact their 
predecessors-in-title and their own tenants had farmed and grazed cattle 
on the land in dispute up to the edge of the former canal levees for more 
than 60 years.373 The only factual conflict concerned whether fences 
enclosed the disputed land and what the community understood about the 
nature of the plaintiffs’ possession.374  
Relying heavily on Verret v. Norwood,375 the defendants argued on 
appeal that the plaintiffs’ possession was precarious because it was 
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“common knowledge in the community” that the canal company 
defendant and its predecessor allowed the owners of contiguous tracts to 
use their land.376 This argument failed to persuade the court of appeal, 
however, because in Merchant the only witnesses who attested to this alleged 
policy of sufferance were the company’s own employees,377 and moreover, 
the company did not prove that the plaintiffs were even aware of the policy.378 
Indeed, buttressing this last point, the court in Merchant distinguished several 
decisions in which courts classified neighbor claimants as precarious 
possessors based on evidence of an acknowledgement or agreement that the 
claimant’s possession was permissive at the outset.379 By contrast, in 
Merchant, the record owner failed not only to show that the possessor–
claimants ever realized they were possessing with the sufferance of the record 
owner, but it also did not prove that the claimants had requested the record 
owner’s permission to use the disputed land or that the canal company had 
specifically granted them such permission.380 As the court summarized in 
Merchant, “an owner’s mere knowledge that someone is possessing adverse 
to his ownership does not prevent the running of acquisitive prescription.”381 
In contrast to Boudreaux, the court in Merchant squarely placed the burden 
of proof on the record owner to rebut the presumption under Article 3427 
of the Civil Code that a possessor was possessing as owner. In other words, 
record owners cannot rest on their belief that they are tolerating an 
adjoining property owner’s use of their property as a matter of neighborly 
convenience and then, only after acquisitive prescription has been alleged, 
assert that the neighbor’s possession was merely precarious. 
Two more decisions in the neighbor context also show that neither 
uncertainty about the location of a boundary nor even actual knowledge 
that a fence extends beyond an actual boundary can necessarily render a 
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claimant’s possession precarious. In Nugent v. Franks,382 the court held 
that claimants acquired ownership of 17 acres of rural land by tacking their 
possession to that of a predecessor in interest.383 Although the defendants 
argued that this predecessor possessed precariously because his cousin and 
neighbor allowed him to use a portion of her land as an accommodation, 
the court of appeal rejected this characterization. It did so by relying on 
the presumption that a possessor intends to possess as owner and by 
pointing to evidence that the predecessor “exercised acts of corporeal 
possession of the property [in dispute] consistent with ownership of the 
type of property involved,”384 that is, in the same manner as the cousin and 
neighbor used her own land. 
Finally, in Livingston v. Unopened Succession of Dixon,385 the court held 
that a claimant had acquired ownership of a strip of land located along the 
border of his neighbor’s property through 30-year acquisitive prescription and 
rejected the record owner’s precarious possession counterargument.386 
Although the facts were generally unremarkable, the court found that the mere 
fact that the possessor–claimant was aware that his fence encroached on his 
neighbor’s property—and even acknowledged that the fenced boundary line 
was incorrect—did not mean that he intended to possess for anyone but 
himself as owner.387 In addition, the court stressed that numerous members of 
the community at large who were familiar with the property testified that the 
fence was recognized as the claimant’s boundary.388 
The decisions that fall into this crucial, third category of possession 
and acquisitive prescription disputes appear to be contradictory. In some 
instances, courts focus on the intrusiveness and extent of the claimant’s 
acts of possession.389 In other instances, courts focus on the degree to 
which the claimants had made investments in their own property 
depending on the neighbor’s acquiescence and the record owner’s 
awareness of this reliance.390 In still other cases, courts appear to be 
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influenced by the degree of community recognition of the claimant’s acts 
of possession as an indication of either toleration or a shift of ownership.391 
Finally, in several cases, courts dwell on the extent to which record owners 
communicated their policy of neighborly accommodation to the claimant 
and whether the claimant recognized that accommodation.392 What 
Louisiana law clearly needs now is a normatively attractive presumption 
that aligns with courts’ predilection to encourage neighborly cooperation 
and a more coherent analytical framework to establish the limits of that 
presumption and to help resolve the difficult claims that arise in disputes 
involving neighbors and members of the same close-knit community. 
III. THE FUTURE OF PRECARIOUS POSSESSION 
Many Louisiana lawyers and jurists must now be wondering what to 
make of the three judicial opinions that emerged from the Louisiana 
Supreme Court decision in Boudreaux, particularly in light of the majority 
opinion’s statement that “[o]ur holding today is strictly limited to the facts 
before us.”393 On the one hand, courts might follow the majority opinion 
and begin to ignore what up until now had been, at least according to 
Justice Knoll (and also Professor Hargrave), the Civil Code’s relatively 
well-understood burden-shifting structure regarding possession.394 In that 
event, courts may well accept assertions of tacit permission summarily, 
without demanding much proof of such permission and without taking into 
account the specific relational context of an acquisitive prescription claim 
or possessory action.395 The defense of precarious possession could then 
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end up swallowing the general principle that possessors are presumed to 
possess as owners, especially in the context of acquisition of servitudes by 
neighbors.396 If courts follow this path, Justice Knoll may well be right that 
Boudreaux “severely jeopardizes the law on acquisitive prescription in this 
state.”397  
On the other hand, this unfortunate outcome could be avoided if 
lawyers, judges, and jurists treat Boudreaux as a cause for reflection and 
as an occasion to begin a new conversation about acquisitive prescription 
and precarious possession in Louisiana. As this Article explains, even 
though Justice Knoll and Justice Weimer each reached a different 
conclusion about the ultimate issue in Boudreaux, both of their opinions 
model a relational approach to the kind of complex factual dispute that can 
arise in a paradigmatic neighbor or close-knit community case. But before 
turning to a detailed reconsideration of Boudreaux, this Article offers new 
jurisprudential tools that could help Louisiana courts make sense of the 
most difficult precarious possession cases they are likely to confront. 
A. New Jurisprudential Tools to Analyze Neighbor and Close-Knit 
Community Cases  
Louisiana courts have generally applied the traditional presumptions 
of possession and precarious possession in cases that fall into the stranger 
and contractual or legal status categories in a consistent and principled 
manner. As Part II.A demonstrates, when confronted with a stranger case, 
courts are hesitant to find that an adverse-possession claimant is a 
precarious possessor as long as it is clear the possessor and record owner 
have had little or no relationship with each other over the years. In these 
situations, the baseline presumption provided by article 3427 of the Civil 
Code—that a possessor is presumed to possess as owner—is usually 
applied vigorously unless clear evidence demonstrates that the claimant’s 
possession began with the permission of or on behalf of another person. 
Conversely, as Part II.B shows, courts confronted with cases that 
clearly fall into the second paradigm—cases in which the parties have a 
contractual or legal status relationship with each other—are appropriately 
attentive to the likelihood that the possessor began to possess precariously. 
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In these cases, the presumption of article 3438—that precarious possessors 
are presumed to continue possess on behalf of another even though they 
may intend to possess for themselves—serves as the foundational 
presumption. As our jurisprudence teaches, however, application of article 
3438 does not mean that a record owner will always prevail in such a case. 
Sometimes, particularly in the context of acquisitive prescription claims 
involving co-owners, a claimant will be able to “[demonstrate] by overt 
and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner that he 
intends to possess the property for himself” so that acquisitive prescription 
can begin to run.398 In general, though, Louisiana courts do not need new 
rules to handle cases falling into either of the first two categories discussed 
in Part II. Rather, they simply must continue to demonstrate sensitivity to 
the distinct relational contexts that these kinds of cases present. 
In true neighbor or close-knit community cases, however, the 
jurisprudential authority is less clear, and as the cases discussed in Part 
II.C demonstrate, courts are much more likely to struggle. Further, when 
the nature of the right claimed is a predial servitude, courts will often have 
difficulty distinguishing quasi-possession that has been adverse from 
simple toleration granted by a record owner, especially when the record 
owner asserts that he has tacitly permitted the claimant to use his property 
in the spirit of being a good neighbor. Yet, as in Boudreaux, when a 
possessor–claimant has used his neighbor’s property for a long period of 
time and appears to have organized his relationship to his own land or to 
his community in reliance on continued access to or use of the record 
owner’s land, strong equitable justifications weigh in favor of recognizing 
his claim as well. 
1. The Presumption of Sharing 
Given the difficulty of cases falling into the third category of possession 
and acquisitive prescription disputes, Louisiana should consider developing 
an additional presumption—a presumption of sharing that would apply 
specifically at the outset of a relationship between a possessor and record 
owner who are practicing, inhabiting, engaged neighbors or members of the 
same close-knit community. Stated simply, this presumption would provide 
that when one neighbor uses a fellow neighbor’s property or when a member 
of a close-knit community uses another community member’s property, that 
use takes place with the implied permission of the owner. This presumption 
could be adopted as a jurisprudential rule by Louisiana courts, or it could be 
expressed in a new Civil Code article. In either format, it would provide a 
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useful complement to the two existing presumptions found in articles 3427 
and 3438 of the Civil Code by aligning judicial decision-making with the 
fundamental values that inform property law and by enhancing the 
predictability of judicial decision-making in this area. 
One justification for a new presumption of sharing can be found in the 
scholarship of Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver, who have 
written powerful pieces about how property law can be understood as an 
institution that serves the goal of promoting human flourishing.399 For 
Alexander and Peñalver, property law is not solely a utilitarian machine 
designed to produce economic efficiency and wealth maximization, 
although these are among the many desirable, incommensurable values 
that property law can and should promote.400 Drawing on Aristotle, 
Aquinas, and other philosophers working in the Aristotelian tradition, 
Alexander and Peñalver argue that because humans are essentially social 
beings who thrive only through and because of their relationships with 
other people and through human community, property law must also be 
understood as serving social values.401 Property law should thus facilitate 
the development of human capabilities that are necessary for individuals 
to be able to choose and pursue their own projects from a meaningful set 
of options while also helping to sustain families, friendships, and 
communities—the very social networks that make human flourishing 
possible.402 
One particular aspect of Alexander and Peñalver’s “human flourishing” 
theory of property law that is directly relevant to precarious possession is 
their insight that an individual must have some property to develop and 
practice one of the essential Aristotelian ethical virtues—what might be 
called “the virtue of sharing.”403 Describing why Aristotle believed that 
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private ownership must form a crucial part of any property system, 
Alexander and Peñalver observe, 
Another reason [Aristotle] gives in favor of private property is that it 
promotes friendship. Aristotle’s thinking here seems to be that 
through proper education individuals will learn that property, though 
privately owned, is to be shared with friends. Relatedly, private 
ownership facilitates the exercise of such virtues as generosity and 
moderation. His point here ties in with the one just raised. Aristotle 
means to say that the possibility of generosity depends upon the 
existence of some degree of private rights. Generosity presupposes a 
voluntary act of sharing, so that the owner must willingly transfer to 
someone else the power to use and enjoy the resource. And her own 
act can only be voluntary and therefore praiseworthy, if she was 
entitled not to share.404 
This insight explains why article 2232 of the French Civil Code 
declared that acts of “mere toleration” cannot lead to prescription and why 
Louisiana courts have been hesitant in neighbor cases like Boudreaux to 
allow a possessor–claimant to acquire ownership or real rights whenever 
owners make plausible arguments that they merely consented to the 
claimant’s use or possession in a spirit of neighborly cooperation. 
Louisiana courts intuitively recognize the importance of encouraging 
neighbors and members of the same community to share their property 
with each other to build the bonds of friendship and reciprocity that make 
community possible. 
Adopting a presumption of sharing will thus encourage courts to 
reveal more fully the likely bases of their decision-making in these 
difficult neighbor cases. In neighbor cases, judges would no longer feel 
the need to manipulate the existing presumptions in the Civil Code to find 
a way of stating an important normative value that they likely bring to bear 
in most neighbor cases already. In short, adoption of a presumption of 
sharing would promote another important systemic virtue—the virtue of 
judicial transparency. 
A final reason to adopt a presumption of sharing is that the 
presumption would enable courts to visualize neighbor and close-knit 
community cases not only from the point of view of the possessor, which 
is the focus of Louisiana’s two existing presumptions, but also from the 
point of view of the record owner. In other words, this new presumption 
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would help judges and lawyers become more fully conscious of what this 
Article contends. They already do so subconsciously in these cases—
approaching these disputes in their full relational complexity. Unlike the 
existing codal presumptions that are focused solely on the state of mind of 
the claimant–possessor, the presumption of sharing directs courts and 
lawyers to consider equally the state of mind of the other party, the 
neighbor who contends that she was merely practicing the Aristotelian 
virtues of friendship and sharing. By openly directing courts’ attention to 
the true owner’s perspective, the new presumption would thus bring to the 
surface the kind of analysis that courts appear inclined to engage in 
regardless, as the Boudreaux case itself demonstrates so clearly. 
2. Indicia of Giving or Renunciation 
Any useful presumption in law should be capable of being rebutted. 
This capability is certainly true for the presumption of sharing. Louisiana 
must recognize, therefore, that at any point during the existence of a long-
term relationship between two neighbors or members of the same close-
knit community, the presumption of sharing could be overcome by clear 
signs that the parties have reached a new equilibrium, a new explicit or 
implicit understanding about the property at issue. To determine whether 
the presumption of sharing has been overcome, courts should be directed 
to employ several specific factual criteria. These criteria, which should be 
called “indicia of giving or renunciation,” could be spelled out in a new 
Civil Code article or articulated jurisprudentially. Either way, they would 
serve to channel judicial discretion in difficult neighbor and close-
community cases in a useful manner.405 
The underlying assumption in this scenario is that property 
relationships are not static. The reasonable expectations and assumptions 
of parties in a long-term property relationship can and do evolve. At some 
point, the presumption that a neighbor is sharing her property with another 
neighbor to whom she has granted some kind of access evaporates, 
especially when it becomes obvious that the passive neighbor has actually 
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given away, renounced, or abandoned all or a portion of her property or 
her right to exclude others from that property. 
In some ways, this reasoning may sound like a restatement of the 
“negligent owner” rationale for adverse possession and acquisitive 
prescription noted earlier.406 This Article’s intention, however, is not to 
encourage courts to make simplistic or conclusory statements about a 
record owner’s passivity. Instead, courts should focus on the way in which 
the neighbor relationship between the possessor–claimant and the record 
owner is transformed. After all, as Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier 
remarked, acquisitive prescription is a legal institution that has startling 
transformative power.407 Courts should therefore be asking if and how 
property relationships potentially affected by acquisitive prescription have 
themselves been transformed. 
With these factors in mind, this Article offers the following indicia of 
giving or renunciation: (1) the physical extent and intrusiveness of the 
claimant’s use or corporeal possession of the record owner’s property;408 
(2) any investments or improvements made by the claimant to the record 
owner’s property in reliance on an implicit promise of continuing access 
to or use of the record owner’s property;409 (3) any changes made by the 
claimant to other property the claimant owns or to the claimant’s other life 
projects, economic or otherwise, made in reliance on continued access to 
or use of the record owner’s property;410 (4) the degree to which the record 
owner’s own actions have signaled an intention to maintain agenda-setting 
authority for the property or, conversely, whether those actions or non-
actions have signaled a de facto abandonment or renunciation of the 
property;411 (5) community perceptions regarding the rights of the parties 
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with respect to the property involved;412 (6) the length of time beyond the 30-
year prescriptive period the claimant has used or possessed the record owner’s 
property;413 and (7) the existence or absence of any acknowledgements by the 
possessor–claimant of the record owner’s authority.414 
A potential objection is that these criteria are too subjective and vest too 
much discretion in judges in neighbor and close-knit community cases 
involving precarious possession. Yet the work that Louisiana courts must do 
to resolve precarious possession defenses in these cases is already subjective, 
as the three divergent opinions in Boudreaux415 and the inconsistent results 
in other neighbor disputes reveal.416 Reasonable judges will always bring 
their own moral and normative perspectives to bear on these kinds of 
cases. If courts were to acknowledge the presumption of sharing explicitly 
and then focus their analysis on whether that presumption has been 
rebutted with regard to the indicia of giving or renunciation, the results of 
neighbor or close-knit community cases would actually become more 
consistent and predictable. At a minimum, courts would be more likely to 
give full attention to the specific relational facts that these criteria 
implicate when they address precarious possession in the neighbor and 
close-knit community context.417 
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B. Reconsidering Boudreaux 
With the preceding new analytical framework in place, this Article 
now reconsiders the dilemma presented by the difficult factual dispute in 
Boudreaux. First, this Section analyzes the three contrasting opinions that 
emerged in Boudreaux. It then demonstrates how the new jurisprudential 
tools offered—the presumption of sharing and the indicia of giving or 
renunciation—could be used to resolve the same factual dispute. 
1. The Boudreaux Opinions 
The majority opinion authored by Justice Clark is not especially 
instructive and, as others have noted, is rather problematic.418 The majority 
opinion holds that the plaintiff, John Boudreaux, was merely a precarious 
possessor of the right of way that crossed the property of defendant Paul 
Cummings by resurrecting the concept of tacit or implied permission from 
article 3490 of the 1870 Civil Code.419 In its crucial passage, the majority 
opinion states that “Cummings’[s] awareness of Boudreaux’s use and his 
allowance thereof marks Boudreaux’s use as an authorized use that cannot 
be characterized as adverse under the circumstances.”420 In effect, the 
majority opinion suggests that if record owners assert their awareness and 
permission of the claimant’s use of their land, even if record owners never 
communicate their toleration or permission to the claimant, the claimant 
then bears the burden of proving that he is not a precarious possessor.421 
Just as problematic is that the majority opinion never explains how to 
determine when the owner has actually tolerated the user’s activities or, 
conversely, has simply been negligent, uninterested, or failed to set or 
maintain an agenda for the property. 
The only gesture in this direction given by the majority opinion is to 
underline a few words from Professor Yiannopoulos’s treatise: acts of 
toleration must not be considered as acts of adverse possession otherwise 
“landowners would be compelled to object to innocent and occasional 
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invasions.”422 This Article respectfully suggests that the long-standing acts 
of use that took place in Boudreaux—60 years of uninterrupted use of a 
neighbor’s land to regularly access a public road and to transport heavy 
farm equipment, significant efforts to maintain the right of way, and finally 
significant efforts to erect, move, and maintain a gate—represent more 
than “an innocent and occasional invasion.”423 Although these actions 
might indeed reflect an agreement between the parties, to characterize 
them as merely an innocent and occasional invasion seems to miss the 
mark. 
Justice Knoll’s dissenting opinion is more helpful. First, it reminds 
Louisiana jurists of what, up until Boudreaux at least, had been the 
conventional understanding of how the general burden of proof regarding 
acquisitive prescription and the two presumptions of possession found in 
articles 3427 and 3438 worked together to order questions of proof.424 
Second, in addition to noting the relative paucity of facts supporting 
Cummings’s assertion of precariousness, Justice Knoll explores with 
considerable care several facts that reveal how important Boudreaux’s use 
of the right of way across the Weill–Cummings property was to him and 
the projects of his family over the years. For instance, in addition to noting 
that Boudreaux mowed and generally maintained the portion of the Weill–
Cummings tract allegedly subject to the servitude, she observes that 
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presumption that a possessor is presumed to possess with the intent to own unless 
“it is shown” by the person opposing the claim of possession, here Cummings, 
that the claimant’s possession was “begun for another” or was begun “with the 
permission of or behalf of the owner.” Id. at 565–66. Only when the opponent—
usually the record owner, but perhaps another person—affirmatively makes this 
showing does the presumption of continuing precarious possession under article 
3438 arise. This second-order presumption, in turn, requires presumptive 
precarious possessors to show that their precarious possession has terminated 
under either article 3439 or 3478. In positive terms, all of these requirements mean 
“the presumption of ownership does arise, absent a showing that the possession 
was begun for another.” Id. at 566. For a brief but authoritative endorsement of 
Justice Knoll’s position see YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 5, § 6.36. See also 
Presumptions, supra note 100, at 237 (stating same sequence of presumptions 
even more succinctly). 




witnesses testified Boudreaux used the passage continuously for various 
purposes, including hauling farm equipment, making visits to the doctor, 
going to vote, and running errands.425 
Further, Knoll reports that Boudreaux employed another individual to 
mow the right of way for him in exchange for permission to keep mowing 
equipment on Boudreaux’s property and how Boudreaux told this same 
individual that the strip of land has “been a right of way for a hundred 
years, that they’ve been using [it] since, you know, since their family 
owned the property.”426 Knoll also observes the intensity of Boudreaux’s 
public commitment to the continuing viability of the claimed servitude, as 
evidenced by his participation in public meetings at which a road 
construction project was being discussed that could have negatively 
affected his use of the right of way.427 
In essence, Justice Knoll’s opinion reveals the extent to which 
Boudreaux’s reliance on the right of way, though prosaic to some, was 
actually central to his ability to flourish as a member of his local 
community. Not only did he use the right of way to facilitate his 
neighborly relationship with the Weills, but this use directly enhanced his 
ability to participate in the economic and civic life of his community.428 
Boudreaux’s 60 years of continuous, uninterrupted use of the right of way 
was not, at least in Justice Knoll’s eyes, a mere “innocent or occasional 
invasion[]”429 of his neighbor’s property. It was essential to his well-being 
and to his civic membership in the community. In a sense, Justice Knoll’s 
opinion illustrates the kind of analysis that would be called for if Louisiana 
courts were to recognize a presumption of sharing and were required to 
examine whether that presumption was overcome through the lens of 
indicia of giving and renunciation. 
Justice Weimer’s concurring opinion also deserves praise in many 
respects. For one, his opinion focuses from the outset on the problematic 
relational nature of the conflict—what he calls “this vexatious dispute 
between neighbors.”430 At first, he suggests that “[b]oth explicit 
permission and tacit permission deriving from acts of ‘good 
neighborhood’ by an owner can defeat the claim of someone who contends 
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he benefits from adverse possession so as to acquire a servitude of passage 
upon the owner’s property.”431 But he is also careful not to subscribe to 
the majority’s broad view that a mere assertion of tacit permission by a 
record owner immediately places the burden of proof on the claimant to 
prove that his possession is not precarious. Indeed, his concurring opinion 
may be understood, in this Article’s view, as an attempt to convince his 
fellow justices and other Louisiana jurists that in this particular 
neighborhood relationship it was the record owner, Cummings, who had 
successfully rebutted the traditional presumption that the possessor, 
Boudreaux, was possessing as owner. In other words, Justice Weimer’s 
opinion is, in fact, already consonant with the kind of analysis that would 
take place using a presumption of sharing and indicia of giving and 
renunciation, except that he was required by the existing law to put the 
burden of proof on Cummings, rather than Boudreaux. 
To Justice Weimer, the facts of this case reveal a deeply collaborative 
relationship of trust between Boudreaux and his initial neighbor, the Weill 
family, that can most accurately be described as resulting in permissive 
use of the right of way by Boudreaux. The most salient facts for Justice 
Weimer relate to the placement of the gate in 1969.432 He correctly points 
out that at the time this episode transpired, the Louisiana Civil Code did 
not allow a discontinuous apparent servitude to be acquired by 
prescription.433 Consequently, Boudreaux’s cooperation with the Weills in 
relocating the gate cannot be explained by suggesting that Boudreaux was 
merely complying with the requirement imposed by Article 748 of the 
Civil Code on servitude holders to cooperate with servient estate owners 
who seek to relocate a servitude to lessen its inconvenience.434 Because 
Boudreaux could not have even begun to acquire a servitude of passage by 
acquisitive prescription in 1969, the duty imposed on servitude holders to 
cooperate with servient estate owners in servitude relocation is simply 
immaterial.435 
Just as important is Justice Weimer’s finding that “the collaborative 
nature of the gate placement, its construction, and its later use to be direct 
and relevant evidence that Mr. Boudreaux used the passageway with 
‘permission’ as required by La. C.C. art. 3437, regardless of whether that 
evidence was adduced on direct or cross examination.”436 Indeed, it is this 
“evidence of neighborly acts on the part of the successive property 
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owners” that convinced Justice Weimer that Cummings had rebutted “the 
presumption that might otherwise arise from the fact of Mr. Boudreaux’s 
possession.”437 This Article interprets these statements to mean that Justice 
Weimer still adheres to the traditional burden-shifting scheme established 
by articles 3427 and 3438 of the Civil Code that Justice Knoll articulated 
so clearly in her dissent.438 The rest of Justice Weimer’s concurrence 
observes other salient facts that support his conclusion that the relationship 
between Boudreaux and the Weills was essentially one of neighborly 
collaboration in which the Weills consciously allowed Boudreaux, his 
family, his tenants, and his workers to use the right of way, and Boudreaux 
demonstrated his appreciation in a number reciprocal gestures.439  
Justice Weimer’s opinion is also noteworthy because it is the only 
opinion in the case that links its conclusion to any policy rationales for 
bad-faith acquisitive prescription. Quoting Planiol,440 Weimer suggests 
that bad-faith acquisitive prescription is primarily justified when a record 
owner has been “guilty of negligence.”441 This suggestion is revealing 
because Weimer does not see the Weills or Cummings as having been 
guilty of negligence. To the contrary, they were merely acting as good 
neighbors in letting Boudreaux use the right of way and engaging in a 
long-term collaborative relationship to maintain that right of way. 
Although Weimer might have explored some of other important rationales 
offered by civil law commentators and U.S. property law scholars 
justifying adverse possession and acquisitive prescription,442 his opinion 
remains far more satisfying than the majority opinion. Furthermore, his 
opinion certainly earns sympathy for its endorsement of the importance of 
moral values in property law.443 
Reasonable jurists can disagree about the correct outcome of a difficult 
neighbor case involving an assertion of acquisitive prescription based on 
more than 60 years of uninterrupted use of a rural right of way on one hand 
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and a plausible precarious-possession defense on the other. However, both 
Justice Knoll’s dissent and Justice Weimer’s concurrence each in their 
own way begin to demonstrate how precarious possession must be 
approached in a deeply contextualized manner that is sensitive to the actual 
relationships between the parties. 
2. Resolving Boudreaux with New Jurisprudential Tools 
If another court were to examine the facts presented in Boudreaux in 
light of the rebuttable presumption of sharing and the indicia of giving or 
renunciation introduced above, an even more satisfactory solution might 
be possible. The court would first recognize that initially the relationship 
between Boudreaux and the record owners would be governed by the 
presumption of sharing. Yet facts relating to the parties’ on-going 
relationship might also reveal that over time the presumption had been 
rebutted. For instance, Boudreaux’s extensive use of the right of way to 
move heavy equipment across the Weill–Boudreaux farm could weigh in 
favor of rebuttal under criteria (1). The work that Boudreaux performed to 
maintain and relocate the right of way and the work that Boudreaux 
performed on the gate could weigh in favor of rebuttal under either criteria 
(2) or (3). The fact that Boudreaux used the right of way not just to move 
farm equipment but to access a public road and to reach the nearest town 
where his community life was based could weigh in favor of rebuttal under 
criteria (3) as well. The absence of any clear signals by the Weills or 
Cummings that they were maintaining their agenda-setting authority, other 
than the Weills’ request to relocate the gate, could also point to rebuttal 
under criteria (4). Any facts pertaining to community perceptions about 
Boudreaux’s rights to use the path across the Weill–Cummings property 
could have been interpreted under criteria (5). Finally, the 60-year history 
of uninterrupted use of the right of way could itself weigh in favor of 
rebuttal under criteria (6). In the end, a decision using this kind of analysis 
might well have persuaded the Louisiana Supreme Court to affirm a 
finding that Boudreaux had obtained a servitude of passage by acquisitive 
prescription even though the Weills initially benefitted from a 
presumption of sharing.444 
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Controversial decisions like Boudreaux v. Cummings can cause dismay 
and confusion in a legal community, but they can also start useful 
conversations. This Article has attempted to begin one of those conversations. 
Rather than merely complain about the confusing statements that emerged 
from the majority opinion in Boudreaux, this Article has attempted to 
reconstruct the law of precarious possession from the ground up. 
This Article has shown how Louisiana’s two-tier system of good- and 
bad-faith acquisitive prescription emerged from Roman law and pre-
codification French and Spanish law. It has shown how French 
commentators interpreted their codified version of that law and, in 
particular, how they approached the problem of precarious possession with 
caution, careful to respect the traditional presumption that a possessor 
intends to possess as owner but aware that in disputes between neighbors 
who share a long-term relationship of cooperation there may be instances 
in which use or access results from simple tolerance. It has also shown 
why Louisiana’s two-tier system of acquisitive prescription is a valuable 
institution that should not be torn apart by overly broad application of the 
concept of precarious possession to claims of 30-year acquisitive 
prescription in particular. 
In addition, this Article has reviewed a significant body of Louisiana 
case law to demonstrate that when courts confront stranger and contractual 
and legal status relationship cases, Louisiana case law generally reaches 
defensible and consistent outcomes that make sense of Louisiana’s 
traditional presumptions and burdens of proof regarding possession. Yet, 
when they approach the most difficult category of possession and 
acquisitive prescription cases—those involving true neighbors or 
members of the same close-knit community—courts face acute challenges 
and often produce inconsistent results. To resolve this kind of case with 
greater sensitivity to the virtue of property sharing and to the specific 
relational context of these disputes, Louisiana property law would benefit 
from the adoption of a presumption of sharing and concomitant indicia of 
giving and renunciation. 
                                                                                                             
testimony about community perceptions about a change in title would have also 
not have availed his rebuttal assertion under criteria (3) and (5). Finally, 
Delacroix’s continued agenda-setting actions with respect to the land in dispute, 
along with Perez’s admissions in his lease letter, would have weighed against 
rebuttal under criteria (4) and (7). 
